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Simulation and formal verification (FV) are the two most commonly
used techniques for verifying a digital design described at the Register-Transfer
Level (RTL). Compared to simulation, formal verification shows an advantage
in terms of exhaustive design coverage. However, due to state-space explosion,
it is limited in size of designs that can be analyzed, and this capacity problem
remains a big issue for application in large designs, such as processors.
In this thesis, a waypoint-based semiformal verification (SFV) method
is proposed in order to extend formal tool capacity for large designs. Our algo-
rithm involves formal engines to explore traces to hit waypoints, reducing the
computation time and memory required to reach a desired state. In addition,
an automatic waypoint generation tool is developed. Criteria are developed to
identify important flip-flops in the design to generate the waypoints, based on
information from the synthesized netlist. A neural network is trained to score
vi
all the flip-flops in the target design. Based on the predicted scores, we set a
threashold to select the critical flip-flops and then generate waypoint guides
for RTL verification.
The process is first studied using a small FIFO example. Then an
expandable end-to-end ISA verification framework designed around a RISC-V
core is evaluated with the proposed SFV techniques. The results show that
waypoint-based SFV and the automatic waypoint generation algorithm have
great potential in RTL verification. SFV can save a substantial amount of
the time and memory required to cover all important scenarios, compared to
direct application of FV.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Classic Verification Techniques
There is a desperate need for practical solutions to the problem of
performing design verification using today’s computing systems, since most
modern digital designs are far too large for traditional tests to guarantee their
correctness and safety. Two main approaches are applied in RTL verification:
dynamic simulation and formal verification (FV) [2].
Simulation-based verification has been applied for a long time. This
approach requires a testbench with manually designed or constrained random
test vectors to propagate logic values through blocks [36]. It is acknowledged
that the traditional simulation method offers the benefits of simplicity and scal-
ability; however, it is impractical for simulation to keep up with the increasing
design complexity [17], and its reliability depends on how comprehensive the
stimuli are. For example, if the design under verification (DUV) state machine
has 64 state variables, then the total time required to simulate vectors to cover
all states will be nearly 600,000 years if each vector takes 1 ms to simulate.
Formal methods are increasingly applied in the verification of complex
digital designs for their ability to detect subtle bugs [41]. The idea of formal
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verification is derived from reasoning based on manipulation of formulas and
logic, that is, the proof is mathematical instead of experimental [24]. Gener-
ally, the name formal can refer to many sub-topics, such as logic equivalence
checking [38], model checking [9, 13] (also known as functional formal analy-
sis), and theorem proving [27]. In this thesis, we will only be dealing with
formal methods using model checking.
Figure 1.1: Comparison between simulation-based and formal verification
Formal model checking technique can verify Register-Transfer Level
(RTL) functional correctness with a set of assertion properties without in-
volving a testbench. Figure 1.1 shows the fundamental difference between
how simulation-based verification and formal verification explore states, where
each circle represents one transition step, or check bound, in formal analysis,
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and the simulation trace is represented by the black arrows. Unlike simula-
tion, where the inputs (random or targeted sequences) result in the target
transitioning through different states, formal verification starts from a given
initial state and analyzes target behavior under user-defined constraints to
verify the assertions. Therefore it can improve verification quality by exposing
corner case bugs or exhaustively proving the correctness of one property, en-
abling shorter design and verification time. Meanwhile, with the emergence of
language standards such as SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA) to define proper-
ties, formal verification has lately become a mainstream verification method.
Development of more efficient algorithms, as well as the performance improve-
ment of CPU and memory units, also push formal tools to produce meaningful
results in practical time frames.
Compared to simulation, formal techniques, such as model checking,
are much more comprehensive in detecting corner case bugs because they can
search for all reachable states in each step. However, formal does not scale
well with large designs [17], which makes it still just one part of the solu-
tion to the massive industrial verification problems. This capacity issue is the
biggest reason that prevents formal from directly replacing any simulation-
based methodologies or tools. Being exhaustive, formal verification can easily
run into state explosion, especially for the enormous state spaces of modern de-
signs. In addition, it is difficult for verification engineers to evaluate the results
when the formal tool cannot present determined outcomes before running out
of memory or exceeding CPU time limits. These issues, which usually occur in
3
verification of large designs, require more effective and innovative techniques
to extend the capability of formal engines while maintaining relative satisfying
coverage.
1.2 Verification Challenges in Modern Processors
The increasing complexity of hardware designs, especially modern pro-
cessors, have been posing a lot more challenges in verification. The industry
has been putting more and more resources into verification than design, yet
still many projects with promising new features are dropped due to the inabil-
ity to fully verify the functionality within a reasonable time period.
Despite decades of research, the exponential growth in the complex-
ity of modern processor designs over the last decades has continued to bring
huge challenges into the verification fields. There are many optimizations to
improve the performance of these microprocessors such as pipelining, forward-
ing, branch prediction, out-of-order instruction, etc. [28]. Even with the same
instruction set architecture (ISA), especially for the open source ones, such as
RISC-V, vendors tend to have various implementations that focus on different
aspects, such as high performance or low power consumption. All the opti-
mizations and implementation diversities stated above have introduced extra
corner cases for the design, which makes verification a critical task to guarantee
system function correctness and safety.
The ultimate goal is to verify the correctness of each instruction that
can cover all critical internal states of the design. The most common tests
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conducted for such a purpose is at the assembly level, where a sequence of
instructions is fed to the core, and values of memory and registers are checked.
However, all of these optimizations or different micro-architectures should not
be visible to the programmer in general, which means that the overall instruc-
tions should be processed one at a time in the designated order in accordance
with the ISA specifications [45]. In this case, such assembly level tests cannot
locate the bugs precisely in RTL related to micro-architectures, but classic
RTL verification requires a deep understanding of what internal signals in the
DUV behaviors are considered as legal, which brings a lot of unnecessary work
to verification teams to ensure the correctness of complex designs. This major
requirement shows the importance of establishing a dependable verification
method to perform an RTL end-to-end ISA verification for each design which
includes all the micro-architecture behavior invisible to the programmer.
On one hand, traditional simulation-based verification requires a deep
understanding of a particular implementation in order to generate the stimuli
to reach those corner cases. Creating such testbench is not only hard and
unreliable, but also expensive in terms of reusability, as the tests would be
specifically designed for one micro-architecture [45]. Furthermore, the state
space of modern processors is huge, especially for 64-bit machines; therefore
it is impractical to obtain full coverage by so-called exhaustive tests. One
purpose of this thesis is to come up with a verification method that is able to
verify the correctness of the instruction operations with higher coverage and
can also be applied to any third party implementations with relatively low
5
effort.
On the other hand, FV usually uses assertions to find violations of
specification, which is suitable to describe correct behavior for the end-to-end
approach. However, the formal engine has to go through nearly all the states
in the design thus resulting in state explosion, which would overload the formal
tool. Some corner case bugs for complex state machines can be very deep for
formal techniques to catch. A better approach is to deal with the urgent need
to solve the capacity issue in FV, which will be discussed in the next section.
There exist some tools that can perform automatic formal verification
on the architectural or transaction level models such as FISACo in [39]. How-
ever, such tools still require human effort in defining informal specifications
and the architecture models, which limits their application. In addition, the
machine-generated properties are usually not human-readable, thus one com-
pletely depends on the soundness of the tools and it can be extremely difficult
to debug if the properties themselves are buggy. In contrast, experienced
verification engineers can write human-readable proofs and provide effective
guidelines. Our intention is to achieve a balance between automation in the
verification process and high-level user involvement.
1.3 Semiformal Verification: Motivation and Related
Work
An integration of simulation with FV, generally referred to as semi-
formal verification (SFV) [1, 2, 17, 58], can have particularly preferable per-
6
formance in situations where bugs are fairly deep and require thousands of
cycles to execute. Semiformal verification combines the completeness of for-
mal techniques and the capacity and ease-of-use of dynamic verification, which
leverages FV in a resource-bounded approach, and thus is a key to scale FV
to larger, more complex designs.
Two general semiformal techniques have been frequently investigated in
the verification area. The first is referred to as augmenting simulation. In this
category, dynamic simulation is first applied to reach certain intermediate state
and then formal engines take over to exhaustively verify the remaining reach-
able states. However, formal search, in this case, would only be effective if it
is triggered fairly close to the failure state. In order to relieve this limitation,
some approaches of augmenting simulation include rarity-guided simulation
[21] that ranks the states for later search iterations, or the automatically gen-
erated lighthouses (important intermediate states) [56] as guideposts towards
the target state.
Another semiformal technique can be referred to as guided simulation.
Abstraction plays a critical role in this type of methods. It is the preliminary
step for formal engines to perform an exhaustive search, which partitions the
reachable states into “rings” as shown in Figure 1.2 based on the depth from
the target. These “rings” can be used to guide simulation towards the inner
rings until it reaches the target states. However, the abstraction can sometimes
be too coarse and the existence of mapping paths back to the concrete design
must be taken into consideration to make sure its validity. To solve the dead-
7
Figure 1.2: Guided simulation using abstraction
end states in a coarse abstraction, many research efforts have been put into
optimization of the abstraction methodology. One solution is to keep a record
of multiples states and maintain a balance between greed and relaxation [16].
Involving domain knowledge can also be effective [15], but it requires extra
efforts from engineers to manually abstract the designs. Data mining has also
been investigated for example in [43] but few applications were demonstrated
on industrial designs and verification testbenches. Meanwhile, localization can
be used to automatically refine the abstraction [18] but the abstracted models
tend to grow very quickly. One promising way to solve this explosion issue
is to abstract away the data-path signals to retain only control-path registers
[50, 58]. Since most bugs are bundled with control issues, verification processes
that focus on exploring control states increase the likelihood to find deep bugs.
Semiformal verification can be very useful in verifying industry designs
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due to its ability to expand the bug hunting capability of FV to detect deeper
state failures in large designs. Although SFV is not as exhaustive as FV, it
does achieve much larger coverage than simulation. In the next chapter, we
will elaborate on the methodology explored in this thesis to apply semifor-
mal techniques using waypoints as intermediate guides towards the target in
complex designs.
1.4 Summary and Chapter Outline
This thesis studies an SFV approach that manages to alleviate the
capacity issue of formal verification for complex modern designs. Unlike some
previous research that only use simple RTL modules as study cases [2], this
thesis investigated an end-to-end verification framework using RISC-V cores
as targets. A waypoint-based SFV algorithm with no testbench required is
proposed where waypoints are important intermediate states that are selected
based on specific criteria. They will serve as the “lighthouses” in the formal
verification process in order to shorten the proof or counterexample exploration
time, thus expanding the capacity of formal tools. The main contribution of
this work is to design a new automatic waypoint generation tool using machine
learning techniques, which is useful for complex DUVs as it can serve as a
complement to manual waypoint selection. In addition, the data set built
for automatic waypoint generation part is open source, which identifies the
importance of the flip-flops based on synthesized netlist information. Both
manual and automatic methods will be evaluated specifically in this work for
9
different design cases.
This chapter gave a brief introduction to related work on semiformal
verification. The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 illus-
trates the semiformal techniques adopted and the algorithm studied in this
work using waypoint-based SFV methods. Chapter 3 introduces an automatic
waypoint generation tool designed by applying neural networks to analyze the
extracted control models. The RISC-V study cases and the corresponding ex-
perimental results are presented in Chapter 4. Conclusions and future work
follow in Chapter 5.
10
Chapter 2
Hybrid Semiformal Verification Methods
This chapter elaborates on the waypoint-based SFV technique that is
adopted and modified in this thesis to extend the formal tool capability.
2.1 Formal Verification Waypoints Definition
It has been illustrated in the previous chapter that formal verification
is likely to run into capacity issues when the target state is too deep to reach
within the limited amount of time and memory resources available. Corner
cases usually require difficult scenarios that can only cover them when part
of the design has reached a certain state, which can take a lot of cycles from
the initial state. For example, in microprocessors, many interesting cases are
likely to happen after the cache becomes active, and perhaps full, but it takes
many cycles to write the configuration registers to enable the specific bits and
many cycles to generate the memory address sequences to fill the cache.
In conventional FV, the particular state from which formal model check-
ing starts is typically the state where the reset signal drops to be inactive. In
the aforementioned example, in order to hit the interesting scenarios, the for-
mal tool has to go through the initial sequence and then enable and fill the
11
cache. To shorten the number of cycles necessary to get to our interesting
states, we could define the intermediate state where configuration is complete
as the start state for model checking. These hypothesized intermediate states
are defined as “waypoints” or “lighthouses”, serving as new start states, from
which formal tool can search deeper until reaching the target state.
Figure 2.1: Multiple waypoints in formal model checking
Figure 2.1 illustrates the general idea of how waypoints serve as the
intermediate states in SFV to find a bug. Instead of directly checking through
all states for the assertions, the formal tool will only hit all or a subset of
the pre-selected waypoints based on some specific search algorithms. In this
scenario, two waypoints reached using simulation are used for the formal tool
to re-start in order to hit the final bug state. When a certain waypoint, such
12
as waypoint 2 in Figure 2.1, is reasonably close to the assertion failure state,
it would be much easier for the tool to hit that failure if it starts from that
waypoint. Without these intermediate states, the state explosion in formal
verification may make our targets unreachable. By doing so, we are able to
reduce the Cone of Influence (COI) at each step. Even in the cases where no
bug exists, the proof time for properties are expected to be largely reduced with
the premise that these multiple COIs at each waypoint can keep appropriate
coverage.
One thing requiring our attention is that the reachable state set de-
pends on the initial state from where model checking starts. Therefore, it is
important to ensure that the selected waypoints are traceable from the reset
state, otherwise the SFV result could run into false negatives.
2.2 Semiformal Technique Using Waypoints
The fundamental idea of applying waypoints is to use the witnesses of
such state as a guide that can lead the formal proof towards the deep target
state. A straightforward example of using waypoints would be a first-in-first-
out queue (FIFO): if our check target is FIFO overflow, the waypoints can
be set to “FIFO is 3/4 full”. Or even, multiple waypoints can be selected
to guide the formal tool towards the target, i.e. “FIFO is 1/4, 1/2, 3/4 full”
respectively. What we have to feed the formal tool is the correct input sequence
that both obeys the design specification and is able to guide the DUV towards
all the waypoints.
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2.2.1 Finding Proper Waypoints
Waypoints can be either explicitly selected by the design or verification
engineers, or automatically generated by machines using specific algorithms,
for example, based on proximity metrics. From the view of the designer, user-
defined waypoints are more effective and often comes naturally. It is suggested
that more users tend to select waypoints manually [2].
Meanwhile, the advantage of machine-generated waypoints lies in the
fact that they do not require human intervention and detailed understand-
ing of the design specification. One intuitive method is generate waypoints
that makes the pre-condition of assert properties to be true. For example,
if the property looks like cond | => seq ##1 res, the automatically gener-
ated waypoints would be when the antecedent cond is true, or more strictly
with seq being true in the successive cycle. Other machine generated methods
may include, for instance, selecting waypoints that are at a specified distance
from the target states from an abstract design, or based on an architecture
model of the design. The main disadvantage of the automatically generated
waypoints is that they are usually less efficient than their user-defined coun-
terparts. What’s more, the generated waypoints are usually large in number,
which could result in expensive computation effort in ordering and reaching
each waypoint, making the later process more complicated or even unfeasible.
This would unnecessarily increase the verification time and effort.
One can also combine the two, conducting a mixed strategy: some
explicit waypoints can be provided by user guidance whereas the others are
14
generated by algorithms.
2.2.2 Traversal Policy
The traversal policy of the waypoints also remains to be an interesting
topic for discussion. It defines the order in which the waypoints are witnessed
in the verification flow, which has a large influence on when the failure state
of the assertion will be hit.
The most straightforward policy could traverse the waypoints in a spe-
cific order. More sophisticated policies usually involve regression in order to
hit the closest waypoint to the current state or failure state. In the latter cate-
gory policy, the search engine will need to continuously check whether current
traverse meets the requirement for a certain period, otherwise, it will restart
from the previous point and insert the latter path into a “blacklist” to avoid
repeating the same path.
2.2.3 Waypoint Propagation Strategies
The major categories of propagation strategies for reaching new way-
points are simulation-based and FV-based propagation. The former can be
further divided into random simulation and dynamic simulation. This section
will elaborate and compare the three strategies in detail.
In the random simulation policy, randomly generated stimuli are fed to
DUV in order to hit the next waypoints [31]. This method is popular because
it does not require the user to create simulation testbenches manually. The
15
external signals of the DUV are constrained with System Verilog assumptions
for formal checks, and the randomly generated stimuli should respect all the
assumptions. It is critical to make the correct assumptions to constrain the
behavior in order to avoid false negatives. Another issue is that this policy
requires consistent models in simulation and formal environments to integrate
the two successfully. However, this is usually not the case. In order to improve
the verification efficiency, models used in simulation and formal engines are
likely to be significantly different. For instance, FV tools tend to replace
parts of the logic with abstractions to fit their capacity. These difficult issues,
especially in complex designs, limits the application of the random simulation
policy in our case.
In the dynamic simulation policy, both the simulation environment and
the simulation testbench should be involved alongside the formal verification
environment. The simulation testbench needs to be run first, and then way-
points are selected on the simulation traces manually or automatically based
on specific rules. Within the set of selected waypoints, each one serves as a
new initial state for formal verification, from which formal engine starts to
search the violation of assertions. The idea of the dynamic simulation policy
is shown in Figure 2.2. From the coverage point of view, the simulation trace
looks “thicker”, which suggests better coverage than using classic simulation
methods alone. The advantage of the dynamic simulation policy is that it
can model practical scenarios by designed test vectors. However, one prob-
lem remains that the FV checks are always in proximity of simulation traces,
16
which are generally very shallow explorations. In addition, the consistent
model requirement mentioned in the context of the random simulation policy
also applies here. These issues make dynamic simulation policy infeasible for
verifying complex hardware designs.
Figure 2.2: Dynamic simulation
In the FV-based propagation policy, waypoints are selected manually
or automatically before starting the verification flow. Those waypoints are
then treated as assertions. For example, “FIFO being 3/4 full” will be repre-
sented in SVA as an assertion of “FIFO is never 3/4 full”. The FV engines will
search exhaustively within bounded steps to find a violation of the waypoints.
The counterexample found is called a “waypoint witness”, which corresponds
17
to the violation trace that can be used as input sequence to reach this wit-
ness point later. The biggest advantage of the FV-based propagation policy is
that the verification environment required is exactly the same as that of clas-
sical FV except for the multiple re-runs based on the waypoints specification
[2]. Therefore, there is no issue with model consistency, and no limitation on
specified assumptions. The disadvantage for this policy is that the adjacent
waypoints should be relatively close to each other, otherwise it will raise prob-
lems due to capacity issues of formal engines. There are commercial tools [44]
already implemented certain engines to accelerate the proof by dynamically
using proved assertions as waypoints for other property checks.
2.2.4 Algorithmic Waypoint-based SFV Flow
As aforementioned, one can either automate the waypoint search or use
manually selected waypoints. The algorithm we will discuss in this section is
based on high-level directions provided by users, but it also works for automatic
process by simply modifying the first waypoint selection step. This guidance
assists the SFV search towards the desired state by encoding the waypoints
with SVA as either cover or assert properties (in our case, we use assertions).
After discussing the algorithm, we are going to elaborate on its effectiveness
using a synchronous FIFO as an example in the next section.
The outline flow chart of the SFV algorithm is presented in Figure
2.3. The sources of waypoints are the fundamental preconditions for the SFV
flow. Given a set of waypoints C1, C2, ..., Cn and the target property P we
18
Figure 2.3: Algorithmic waypoints-based SFV flow
plan to verify, the manual waypoint traversal policy will be applied. All way-
points should be pre-ordered in sequence before starting witness checks. For
each waypoint Ci, the formal engine will perform a bounded model check and
search for a witness of this waypoint using a corresponding assertion Ai. An
assertion “failure”, in this case, should be treated as a successful witness, and
the counterexample trace is generated to serve as preliminaries for calculating
the new arbitrary starting state for the next run. Intermediate new initial
state calculation is a critical step in this algorithm because it must satisfy all
the constraints for the system, otherwise, we could end up having false failures
that are unreachable or not able to hit the corner case bugs. To make sure the
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new initial state is valid and compatible with the DUV, the counterexample
trace is saved after each run to serve as the next input sequence to lead the de-
sign to the previously checked waypoint. Since the first counterexample trace
is generated from the reset initial state, it is guaranteed that Ci is reachable
if counterexamples are found. This input sequence is iteratively built upon
successive waypoints witnesses, ensuring that all waypoints including the final
target state are reachable from the original reset state. This algorithm rules
out the possibility of bogus witnesses and counterexamples.
If a certain waypoint cannot be reached within a bounded time, the
unreachability issue should be reported, and the waypoints will be re-ordered
or re-selected. It is also possible to only roll back one step, using heuristic
methods to specify the new waypoint. These issues will not be included in the
discussion of this work but are worth studying.
The search steps are repeated as the subsequent waypoints to guide
the FV engine towards deeper design behaviors. When the last waypoint Cn,
also the target state condition, is reached, we run FV checks for the target
property P and report the result.
Another thing that needs to be mentioned here is that multiple threads
running in parallel would result in better performance in the search. In addi-
tion, depending on how deep the target state is, single or multiple waypoints
can be selected to guide the formal check to reach states that traditional FV
can never reach. As shown in Figure 2.4, the black curve shows the runtime
increase versus check bound for isolated FV, while the blue curve models the
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Figure 2.4: Ideal runtime reduction with waypoints-based SFV
performance of waypoint-based SFV. It is clear that SFV runtime is growing
linearly, while FV runtime increases exponentially, which indicates that using
waypoints can greatly improve the capacity of the formal engines.
2.3 A Toy Example: Synchronized FIFO
A simple synchronized First-in-first-out (FIFO) module (source code
in Appendix C.1) is introduced here to verify the concepts elaborated above.
The DUV interface is presented in Table 2.1, where FIFO DEPTH will be
gradually increased in order to touch the boundary of FV capacity in our
specific verification environment: running Cadence JasperGold on a server
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with four Intel E5-2690 CPUs and a memory size of 8GB. In this example,
Jasper Engine, Hp, Ht are used for coverage checks and Engines N, B for
assertion checks.
Table 2.1: Interface of Synchronized-FIFO under verification
Name Type Length Description
clock input 1 system clock
reset input 1 high active asynchronize reset
wr input 1 write enable, rising edge active
rd input 1 read enable, rising edge active
empty output 1 high active FIFO empty flag
full output 1 high active FIFO full flag
din input DATA
WIDTH
data for write
dout output DATA
WIDTH
data for read
DATA
WIDTH
parameter any integer the width data stored in FIFO
FIFO
DEPTH
parameter any integer 2FIFO DEPTH being the number of
data can fit in FIFO
To make the comparison clearer, our experiments are conducted with
different values of FIFO DEPTH and waypoint selection. Each experimen-
tal group only has one variable different from the control group. Note that
although all other tasks are killed before the tests to make sure the amount
of resources available is relatively stable, it is possible some resources will be
occupied by other users from time to time. In order to generate results with
more accuracy, multiple tests (> 3) are conducted and the results presented
are the averages from these runs.
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Table 2.2: SVA properties checked with Synchronized-FIFO
Name Type Description
ck empty correct assert check the correctness of condition for empty
flag being active
ck full correct assert check the correctness of condition for full flag
being active
ck empty once cover cover the case that empty flag is raised at
least once
ck full once cover cover the case that full flag is raised at least
once
ck empty to full cover cover the case that empty flag is raised and
then full flag is raised after certain period
ck full to empty cover cover the case that full flag is raised and then
empty flag is raised after certain period
ck wr num cover check whether write operations are executed
from zero up to an upper bound (set to be
three times more than the FIFO DEPTH)
ck rd num cover check whether read operations are executed
from zero up to an upper bound (set to be
three times more than the FIFO DEPTH)
ck all used cover check whether all the positions in FIFO are
used at least once
The assert and cover properties included in the evaluation of this exper-
iment are shown in Table 2.2, where all data are raw without post-processing.
Since our goal for this test is to prove the concept that waypoints can guide
large designs to reach deeper states, coverage for each spot in the FIFO is the
primary check on which we are focusing. In addition, assertions for correct
“full” and “empty” behaviors are also included. A list of properties written
for this experiment is presented in Table 2.2, the implementation of which uses
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auxiliary code to ensure the efficiency of SVA in the formal engine.
(a) Memory usage growing with formal check runtime
(b) Maximum memory usage (c) Total runtime
Figure 2.5: Comparison of memory usage and runtime of synchronized FIFO
with various FIFO DEPTH
First of all, in order to illustrate the FV capacity issue more clearly,
Figure 2.5 presents the fundamental idea that both memory consumption and
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runtime required for FV grows exponentially as FIFO DEPTH increases. One
bit added to FIFO DEPTH shows that the number of data fit in the FIFO
doubles. In the first test, all properties listed in Table 2.2 are enabled. When
the size is relatively small, a formal tool can cover all properties very fast.
However, if the size keeps increasing, the resources needed for full coverage
are going to explode very quickly. As a matter of fact, simply increasing the
FIFO DEPTH to 8 will result in a large number of non-deterministic cover
points: our experiment shows that after a 24 hour TIMEOUT limit, only
102 out of total 256 spots in the FIFO are covered with approximately 6GB
maximum memory required for the computation.
Since this example is to give the readers a general idea of how waypoint-
based SFV can effectively extend the FV tool capability, the experimental
group will use a medium size (FIFO DEPTH = 5) FIFO as our DUV. We
only focus on pushing the FIFO to the full status because the FV tool will
find the shortest path automatically for each property and those properties
listed in Table 2.2 do not always share the same effective waypoints. This
way, we only need to check ck all used and ck full once thereby simplifying
the procedure to generate input sequence to hit the waypoints.
The result is presented in Figure 2.6 – 2.8. Three conditions are tested
for evaluation.
1. Classic FV without waypoints;
2. SFV with single waypoint close to target state;
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of memory consumption versus runtime among FV,
SFV with single and multiple waypoints
3. SFV with multiple waypoints spread out in the design.
To validate the queue logic in stressed “full” state, waypoints are selected
manually, with “3/4 full” for case 2 and “1/4 full”, “1/2 full”, “3/4 full” for
case 3.
To clarify, the data collected includes both the process to hit the way-
points and the subsequent runs using the input sequence to cover the rest
states from there. It is clear that using waypoint-based SFV can reduce the
memory consumption enormously, as well as the check time for each step with
the FV tool going deeper. Meanwhile, the cover properties are proved to be
covered much faster using SFV than classic FV. It can also be concluded that
the deeper the FV tool goes, the longer the time it needs to complete the cur-
rent check. This feature implies that our waypoint-based SFV methods can
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of runtime versus check bound among FV, SFV with
single and multiple waypoints
Figure 2.8: Comparison of coverage percentage versus runtime among FV,
SFV with single and multiple waypoints
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be especially beneficial in very large designs.
Apart from the benefits of using waypoints, it can be seen from Figure
2.6 – 2.8 that multiple waypoints can result in faster check and lower mem-
ory consumption to cover all states. However, this improvement from single
waypoint to multiple ones is not as fruitful as “from 0 to 1”. Considering
the fact that multiple waypoint SFV requires much more effort from the user
to define the intermediate states and find the correct input sequences, it is
probably more effective to only involve a single waypoint if it works with the
target design, whereas multiple waypoints can be applied to extremely large
state machines to exploit the benefits.
Now we can draw a conclusion that waypoint-guided SFV can largely
increase the capacity of the formal tools in our toy example. Even though it is
a very simple FIFO module, the capacity issue easily emerges with reasonably
increased FIFO depth. Considering the common designs in real applications
we will be dealing with are much larger, this issue will be a severe obstacle
for applying formal verification to achieve an exhaustive check. Therefore, the
waypoint-guided method can be very promising in terms of its considerable
coverage and capacity. In the next chapter, we will discuss the implementation
of machine learning techniques to generate guidance for waypoints to assist in
situations where it is difficult to define them with manageable human effort.
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Chapter 3
Automatic Generation of Guide Waypoints
3.1 Introduction to Neural Networks
Neural networks have been the research hot-spots in the field of artificial
intelligence since the 1980s. A neural network abstracts the neural network in
the human brain from the perspective of information processing, establishes
a simple model, and can be used to generate different networks according
to different connection methods. It has been proved that a neural network
can represent arbitrary linear or non-linear functions [35], which is usually
an approximation of a certain algorithm or function in nature. In the past
ten years, many research efforts have been put into artificial neural networks.
Neural networks have successfully solved many practical problems in the fields
of pattern recognition, intelligent robots, computer vision, speech processing,
etc., that are difficult for traditional algorithms to resolve [29].
The network consists of a large number of nodes (or neurons) that are
massively interconnected [49]. Each node represents a specific output function
called an excitation function. A weight is assigned to each connection between
every two nodes to represent the connection strength. The output of the
neuron depends on the input variables, the weight value, and the excitation
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Figure 3.1: Neuron structure diagram with activation functions
function. In addition, the output of the neural network is also affected by the
connection pattern of the network [49].
In the neural network, the neurons in each layer are associated with
functions generally referred to as “activation functions”, which decide whether
this neuron will be fired or activated [48]. Figure 3.1 shows the neural net-
work structure with each neuron associated with the corresponding activation
function, where x is the input vector and ω is the weight vector from other
neurons. The connection of a typical neural network will be illustrated in later
section. Note that the activation functions used in this thesis are non-linear,
which helps the de-linearization process of transformation in each neuron.
The neural network can be trained to learn the weight matrix that
controls how variables propagate through the neurons. The optimization goal
of the training is to make the prediction values as close as possible to the true
value, which can be evaluated by loss function. In a regression problem, the
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loss function is usually measured by mean squared error (MSE), which is the
average value of the sum of the squared errors between the predicted values
and the true values [22].
Gradient descent (GD) is a common neural network optimization al-
gorithm. By calculating the gradient, the parameters in the network move
towards the negative direction of the gradient, so that the loss function is able
to reach the minimum value locally. However, traditional GD needs to min-
imize the loss function on all training data. When the neural network needs
to train a huge data set, the amount of computation required is very large.
A compromise is to calculate the gradient of the loss function with only a
subset of all the training data each time. This small amount of data is usually
called a “batch”, so this partition calculation method is usually referred to as
batch gradient descent (BGD) [46]. BGD can greatly reduce the training time
without affecting the convergence result, thus has become the mainstream to
optimize parameters.
The target of our training is to minimize MSE by optimizing parameters
in each layer using BGD in order to move the training results closer towards
the true values.
3.2 Why We Need Machine Generated Waypoints
Chapter 2 presented a waypoint-based SFV algorithm to extend the
capacity of formal verification of microprocessors. Despite many advantages
of high-level user-selected waypoints mentioned above, it is necessary to in-
31
vestigate machine generated ones due to the growing number of large complex
designs which are difficult to analyze by verification engineers without design
details. In addition, many high-level hardware description languages, such as
Chisel [7] are becoming more and more popular. In such designs, low level
RTL design languages, i.e., Verilog or VHDL, are given up in exchange for a
more convenient and better-structured design methodology. Therefore, it is
impossible to apply high-level waypoint selection on large designs, especially
those generated from higher level languages with machine-generated names for
internal signals.
It is difficult to find an obvious relationship between the information
that we can get from Verilog source code and whether this state is critical to be
our guide waypoints. As introduced in the previous section, neural networks
can extract hidden features in higher dimensions, thereby being more suitable
for solving problems with hard-to-describe relationship between features and
results like this.
In order to provide guidance of waypoint selection in such situations,
a tool based on combined Python and Tcl is implemented to perform the
automatic generation of the critical flip-flops. These critical flip-flops are then
taken as guides for corresponding target states in the verification plans. This
will involve a Verilog syntax analyzer and machine learning techniques. The
detailed algorithm will be discussed in detail in the later sections.
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3.3 Automation Procedure
3.3.1 Extraction of Control Models
Control signals are usually dominant in system behavior. In addition,
control logic designs are often built around finite state machines (FSMs), in
which some of the states are “idle states” that keep waiting for certain trigger
signals, causing the design to be very deep and complex. Therefore, extracting
control models can be the core step to solve the reachability problems in com-
plex design verification. Meanwhile, those control signals can help to narrow
down the target design size, facilitating system analysis by formal tools.
Two simple models [25, 50] shown in Figure 3.2 are elaborated here to
assist the heuristic algorithm in order to make a decisions on whether a signal
belongs to the control set or the data set.
(a) Pure sequential logic (b) Mixed combinational and sequential logic
Figure 3.2: Typical control path model
We first consider the Verilog module in Figure 3.2a, where some flip-
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flops would store their own history values, whereas, for others, their current
value is computed every cycle without directly referring to their previous
states. The former will be referred to as critical state registers and the latter
as data registers. Usually, pure sequential logic corresponds to “always” blocks
with signals sensitive to the system clock in the RTL code.
Another common situation would be the case shown in Figure 3.2b,
where the output value of the flip-flop affects the sequential logic indirectly
by going through combinational logic first. In this case, we need to continue
exploring the assignment values in combinational logic until we reach a clocking
event to determine whether this flip-flop is within the critical control flow or
not.
3.3.2 Training Data Set Acquisition
In order to acquire data that are related to information in the con-
trol model, we need information from the synthesized netlist, which can be
found, for example, using Cadence RTL Compiler (RC). This tool can per-
form generic synthesis and provide timing path and connection information
for inputs, outputs and registers for the design system regardless of how they
are implemented in the modules. In this work, only internal flip-flops are
analyzed since the interface inputs and outputs usually have clear definitions
based on the design specification, thus being easy to figure out whether they
are critical control signals.
There are nine features for each flip-flop we obtain from the tool as
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shown in Table 3.1. Some features are extracted directly from the RC tool
while the others have been processed with simple arithmetic to get values in
proportion.
Table 3.1: Feature vectors of the data set
Notation Description
Rin The rate of input ports connected to the flip-flop over the
total number of input ports
Rout The rate of output ports connected to the flip-flop over the
total number of output ports
>> R The number of pins, ports or cells that exist in the fanin cone
of the specified flip-flop (must be timing start points)
R << The number of pins, ports or cells that exist in the fanout
cone of the specified flip-flop (must be timing end points)
>> Rv The number of all pins, ports or cells that exist in the fanin
cone of the specified flip-flop
Rv << The number of all pins, ports or cells that exist in the fanout
cone of the specified flip-flop
Loop Whether the specified flip-flop (or a group of flip-flops serves
different bits of the same signal) affect its own value in the
subsequent cycle
Len The number of bits for specified signal (two-dimensional mem-
ory storage will only be reduced to one-dimensional signal)
Hier specify the level of submodule, with 0 being the top module
After data acquisition, the next step is classifying flip-flops to make up
the training set. Although we would love to have two clearly distinguished
categories for the signals, it is sometimes hard to completely distinguish be-
tween control and data signals. An example would be the instructions fetched
in microprocessors: on one hand, they are data from memory or cache, on
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the other hand, they decide how the following pipeline stages work, which is
more like control signal functions. Therefore, we will label each flip-flop in the
training set with a score between 0 and 1 instead of directly classifying them
as critical or non-critical. The continuous score is based on the control model
illustrated in the previous section, but real situations are much more complex
so we also involve some heuristics based on the actual behavior of the design.
Table 3.2: Design information for neural network training data set
Design name Number of FFs
a25 write back 44
ahb2wb 84
alu with selected input output 83
arbiter 4
asynchronized spi 62
axis master 15
axis arb mux 4 37
axis slave 5
axis switch 4 184
SSP fifo 53
ftdi wb bridge 145
hpdmc 216
i2c controller 159
i2c master 150
jtag 70
lock 3
o8 controller 53
reed solomon decoder 9228
sdc fifo 771
sequence detector 3
SSP 134
wishbone 72
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To gather sufficient data for training, feature extraction is performed
on 22 designs, the number of flip-flops of which is listed in Table 3.2. They are
either from https://opencores.org or implemented by the author; all the
designs have been uploaded to the GitHub repository mentioned in Appendix
A.3. The script used with the RC tool is given in Appendix A.2.
3.3.3 Finding the Critical Flip-flops
According to the aforementioned fundamental ideas, the neural network
constructed for waypoint generation is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The details
of each layer are as follows.
• Input layer: there are 9 nodes representing 9 features illustrated in sec-
tion 3.3.2
• Hidden layer: full connection is implemented to connect the hidden layer
with input layer nodes. Only single layer is used with 100 nodes. This
can be extended to get more comprehensive training result. We choose
the most commmonly used ReLu function to be our excitation function
to perform de-linearization task.
• Raw output layer: full connection is implemented to connect the hidden
layer with raw output layer. There is only one node in the raw output
layer, representing the raw score from the neural network.
• Map layer: using the Sigmoid function to map the raw score (−∞,+∞)
to the (0,1) distribution.
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• Output layer: final score.
Figure 3.3: Algorithm structure of the neural network
In the training process of the model, MSE is used as the loss function,
and the BGD algorithm is applied as the parameter optimization method.
The equation for MSE is given in Eq.3.1, where N is the sample number in
one batch, yi is the true value, and yˆ is the predicted value from the neural
network. The specific parameters after tuning are presented in Table 3.3. Note
that the regularization coefficient is set to zero because the results imply there
is no over-fitting problem. In the future, more data needs to be collected to
expand the data set and further reduce the loss function.
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MSE(y) =
1
N
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)2 (3.1)
Table 3.3: Neural network training parameters
Parameter Value
Batch 100
Base Learning Rate 0.8
Learning Rate Attenuation 0.99
Regularization Coefficient 0
Training Round 2500
Average Moving Attenuation Rate 0.99
The entire neural network is based on the Keras framework (Tensorflow
as backend) [12]. The parameters listed in Table 3.3 are tentative results and
might not represent optimal solutions.
With the trained model, test data collected from the DUV are fed to
it to get the prediction results. After retrieving the score for each flip-flop,
we can set a threshold to select the critical ones for later use. This threshold
depends on the requirements for practical application. We will elaborate on
this in later sections.
3.3.4 Generating Guide Waypoints
We now have the score of all Flip-flops in the target design. Based on
the scores, we can set a threshold to select single or multiple flip-flops as the
the critical ones, which serve as a database for the waypoint generation step.
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In this section, we will discuss the algorithm for single waypoint generation.
Multiple waypoints generation would be similar, but with more rounds of
iteration and regression in later verification because there is a higher chance
that the generated waypoints are out of order or not reachable.
We will first define some notation before proceeding with our illustra-
tion of the generation algorithm. Suppose we have a model M for the FSM of
our target design, we will have:
M = (S, I, s,→)
Where S is the state variables, I stands for input variables, s is the initial state
assignment, and → represents the state transition. Note that all reachable S
are correlated with at least one transition →.
A one-step state transition can be represented with [Sn] × [I] → [Sm].
If we call a certain Sm “CurImg”, the states Sn that can enter Sm in one clock
cycle with corresponding I is defined as “PreImg”; if Sn is “CurImg”, the states
Sm that the “CurImg” can transfer to in one clock cycle with corresponding
“I” is defined as “NxtImg”.
Before starting the analysis of the Verilog source files, we need to de-
termine the CFF pool for critical flip-flops out of all the flip-flops that we are
interested in. From this stage, all operations are conducted for the flip-flops
in the CFF pool.
For a specified state [Si], we can define the current state as “CurImg”
according to the FSM transition graph. We define its “PreImg” as those states
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that can directly reach CurImg state without passing through an intermediate
state, and “NxtImg” as those can be directly transited from CurImg via no
intermediate state. All CFF should store some values in the specified CurImg,
and those flip-flop values can be calculated by parsing the information of RTL
source code in the “CurImg”, “PreImg” and “NxtImg”.
As for the RTL code, we will use Cond to represent a condition state-
ment, RV for right value of the assignment and LV for the left value of the
assignment. In addition, we need to pay attention to NOT logic, i.e., ! and
∼ symbols, of the interesting flip-flops since the reverse logic affects how we
pair those values in the assignment. This feature will be used for waypoints
automatically generated in the next step.
With the notation clarified above, we can provide the Algorithm 1
in pseudo code for waypoint generation based on the selected CFF and the
parsed RTL code.
Assume CFF is not an empty set, a new flip-flop list X is initialized
with all elements in CFF . Besides, Waypoint set is initialized as an empty set
for later appending. The generation loop (Line 3) will evaluate each element
x in the list X in sequence. For each x, its “Nickname” is first searched
through the RTL code based on two criteria: 1) when x is the only RV in
the assign statement, the corresponding LV is defined as a Nickname of x;
2) when x is directly connected to an input or output port of other modules,
that port is defined as a Nickname of x. The Nicknames should be appended
to list X for the exact same search in later looping starting Line 10 and Line
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Algorithm 1 Waypoints Generation
Require: CFF 6= ∅
1: X ← ∀x ∈ CFF
2: Waypoints← ∅
3: for x ∈ X do
4: if x found as the only* RV in combinational assignment then
5: append LV to X
6: end if
7: if x is directly connected to submodule ports then
8: append the connected port to X
9: end if
10: for ∀x ⊂ Combinational Logic do
11: if x ∈ ∀Cond then
12: append (Cond) to Waypoints
13: end if
14: end for
15: for ∀x ⊂ Sequential Logic do
16: if x ∈ ∀Cond then
17: append (Cond) to Waypoints
18: end if
19: if (x ∈ ∀RV ) ∪ (corresponding LV ∈ CFF ) then
20: append (RV ##1 LV) to Waypoints
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: return Waypoints
15. The next step is analyzing the RTL code to generate waypoints. First,
we go through both combinational logic (=) and sequential logic (<=) to
check whether x belongs to the conditional statement, such as if and case
(Line 11 and Line 16). If yes, the entire condition logic will be added to the
Waypoints set. Besides, there is one more case for sequential logic where we
can select waypoints: if x belongs to any RV , and the corresponding LV is
42
also within CFF set (Nickname excluded), then the sequence RV ##1 LV
should be added to the Waypoints set (Line 19). When all elements in list X
are analyzed, the loop ends and the Waypoints set is returned. In addition,
the algorithm description with symbol * can be altered to meet specific needs.
We will give an example in Chapter 4.
Note that in an application of the generated waypoints, we need to add
‘!’ if we use SVA to find the trace. No such reverse logic is needed if we use
coverage properties.
It is worth mentioning that another important issue in the automatic
process is how to order the generated waypoints. This order process is com-
pleted manually in this work. We suggest that future work can apply heuristic
regression referring to fanin and fanout metrics to further automate this step.
3.3.5 Result Evaluation
To evaluate the proposed automatic waypoint generation methods, we
apply the same synchronized FIFO example used in Chapter 2.
First, the neural network model is trained with the collected data set
illustrated in Section 3.3.2 using Keras. This model is then used to score
each flip-flop, which we refer to as “machine-predicted score”. Meanwhile, we
manually score each flip-flop as a ground-truth, which is referred to as “user-
defined score”. Figure 3.4 shows the squared errors between corresponding
user-defined score and machine-predicted score. The machine scores increase
alongside the horizontal axis from left to right, but the coordinate values are
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not evenly distributed because we want to show each spot clearly. As shown
in the figure, the squared errors at both ends are quite small while the me-
dian ones are relatively large. This result is acceptable because our goal is
to find the critical flip-flops with a very large score. Those flip-flops belong
to data path have small scores in both user-defined and machine generated
cases, which are ensured to be eliminated. The only concern remaining is the
middle part with large squared errors. However, scoring itself is actually am-
biguous, especially for these hard-to-define flip-flops with median scores. Since
even humans cannot give a clear classification, we can take them out of our
consideration. The original data is attached in appendix B.2.
Figure 3.4: Squared error between user-defined scores and machine-predicted
scores
A threshold should be set manually to pick the CFF set for the next
step. The decision on threshold depends on practical application, but we
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suggest a basic rule that selected CFF should not include those with large
squared errors. A fundamental way to judge whether the predicted scores are
rational is to evaluate the selected CFF based on the original RTL design.
In this example, we set 0.8 as the threshold so that:
CFF = {dffw1, dffw2, full reg, wr reg}
The detail of these signals can be referred to Appendix C.1. This result is
consistent with our arbitrary definition of control signals in the synchronized
FIFO module. These critical flip-flops will serve as the preliminary dataset for
the waypoint guide generation in the next step.
We develop a Python script to perform the waypoint guidance genera-
tion for each flop in the CFF set. It also returns the interesting line in the RTL
code in case users may want to check the design and introduce some human
intervention in deciding waypoints. The result is presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Automatic generated waypoints guide
CFF Waypoints line
dffw1 (dffw1) ##1 (dffw2) 21
dffw2 null null
wr reg (rd succ == wr reg) 91
full reg (∼full reg) 99
The next step is applying the one or multiple waypoints from Table
3.4 to SFV flow. However, can be noticed that these waypoints could guide
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the system a different direction which may not include our target states. In
addition, the memory resources and time required to automatically select and
order multiple waypoints can be too high. Therefore, combining automatic
generation results and artificial analysis may be more effective to reach the
target state.
The test conducted applies a more effective direction which lets the user
select and order the waypoints for our target from the guidance list. In addi-
tion, higher hierarchical conditions can be added to the waypoints to specify
them in more detail. This is also a good example of the reason why human
intervention is preferred even with the generated guidance list. Therefore, the
waypoint can be selected as (∼ empty && (wr reg == rd succ)) to help to
hit the target state faster. Besides, the same environment, running Cadence
JasperGold engine Ht & Hp on the server with four Intel E5-2690 CPUs and
memory size of 8GB, is used in this test. To obtain better comparison results,
we take the same coverage property, ck full once and ck all used in Table 2.2,
as our target states and test the amount of the time and memory needed for
the formal engine to reach them.
Table 3.5: Comparison between FV and SFV with automatic generated way-
points
total runtime /s memory consumption /MB
w/o waypoint 149 251.67
w/ manual waypoint 4.35 65.96
w/ automatic waypoint 78 65.68
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Figure 3.5: Runtime growth versus bound of FV, SFV with manually selected,
and automatic generated waypoints
We compare run times between FV and SFV with automatically gen-
erated waypoints using the synchronized FIFO with FIFO DEPTH of 5. The
result is presented in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.5, where total runtime and max
memory consumption using automatic generated waypoints are significantly
improved by 47.7% and 73.9% respectively compared to isolated FV. The
reduction in runtime using SFV with waypoints generated by the proposed
algorithm appears to be from nearly exponential to linear growth. However, it
is undeniable that the manually selected results presented in Chapter 2 appear
to be more effective than this automation algorithm, as shown in Figure 3.5 in
terms of runtime growth. However, in the cases where the DUV design details
are ambiguous or too complex, this automation method can still be of great
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benefit.
3.4 Other note: Coverage Metrics
Besides waypoint generation automation, there are many other applica-
tions for the identified critical flip-flops, such as fault tolerance and coverage.
In this section, we will discuss the application from the aspect of coverage met-
rics based on the critical flip-flops found from the aforementioned algorithm.
Evaluation of whether verification results give sufficient confidence re-
garding the correctness of the design depends heavily on the coverage metrics.
Most of the mainstream verification flows use coverage metrics such as line cov-
erage, signal coverage, branch coverage, etc., which can be generally classified
into two categories: code coverage and function coverage [3]. However, many
of these are ambiguous and incomplete for situations where multiple decisions
on state transitions are made together. The thesis research in [25] designed
an automatic coverage directives generation tool by analyzing RTL written
in Verilog HDL. However, the coverage properties written in SystemVerilog
bear the advantages that they can be integrated with most simulators and
formal tools easily. One potential issue is that the properties generated from
large designs require a huge amount of computation. The main drawback is
that this process may take an impractical time to run. Even it can generate
all properties within a tolerable time, the possibility of having unreachable
coverage properties increases due to the large number of properties generated,
and it is hard for humans to distinguish whether the unreachable coverage is
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due to the problem of automation tool or the deficiencies in the verification
plan. Therefore, we could use the method illustrated in this chapter to find the
CFF as a subset of all registers, which helps the coverage directives generation
tool to focus only on the critical control flow. Even excluding the automation
tool, these critical flip-flops can still serve as a good guide for manual coverage
metric design.
In addition, other similar algorithms can also be applied here to au-
tomatically generate the coverage metrics guides. The only difference lies in
how to select the CFF pool. The number of flip-flops selected can be very
flexible since we provide a continuous scoring prediction instead of an absolute
classification. Designers can choose any threshold based on their own project
requirements.
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Chapter 4
Experiments and Results
4.1 Application Guidelines
Before looking into the study cases, we will first specify the cases where
the application of waypoint-based SFV flow would be more suitable and ben-
eficial.
The SFV flow proposed in this work is able to largely improve the
performance of verification in large design, where classic FV easily run into
complexity issues. The keypoint in our SFV flow is to select the proper way-
points. For example, in microprocessor verification, we could bypass the long
initialization sequence through the peripheral bus to configure all the architec-
tural registers. Another case, also for microprocessor verification, is that we
can select waypoints based on the pipeline stages in order to reduce the size of
the COI. For instance, if we take the state right after decoding as waypoint,
we can focus on the specific instruction for verification.
In this Chapter, experiments on RISC-V cores will be conducted and
the corresponding performance will be evaluated.
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4.2 RISC-V Verification Setup
Chapters 2 and 3 introduced the SFV algorithm with manually selected
and automatically generated waypoints in detail and demonstrates their effec-
tiveness with a simple example of a synchronous FIFO. Since the capacity issue
that we are trying to solve is more likely to appear in large complex systems,
we will take RISC-V processors as our test objects in order to verify the effec-
tiveness of the proposed algorithm in such a real application. In this section,
we will present the verification flow based on the proposed SFV method and
the corresponding results of the study cases.
In order to verify the RISC-V cores, it is better to build an expandable
formal verification framework based on the RISC-V specification to conduct
classic FV as a control group. The framework used in this thesis is based on
the work of [54], the structure of which is presented in Figure 4.1. The RISC-V
Formal Interface (RVFI) can serve as the communication ports between the
DUV and the SVA checkers. The rvfi wrapper is connected directly to RVFI,
which provides not only the standardized wrapper, but also the input con-
straints that can mimic the correct bus behavior of the design. These input
constraints will change based on a specific design. Otherwise, incorrect input
constraints can result in weird illegal behavior and false negatives in verifica-
tion, which is also an important research topic but will not be discussed in
this thesis. The primary verification targets are the instructions based on the
supported RISC-V ISA specification. The rvfi insn check module performs
this task by having an expandable interface that can be connected to various
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modules designed specifically for describing valid behaviors of each instruction.
The formal verification top module rvfi testbench integrates all the SystemVer-
ilog (SV) modules that have property checkers or auxiliary codes. Note that
this rvfi testbench can also connect to other checkers with different configu-
ration macros. These macros must be defined before loading any RVFI files
correctly. In addition, this framework can be set up for bounded model checks
or unbounded verification depending on factors such as the overall complex-
ity of the core and verification requirements. In our test cases, we configure
framework for bounded model checks by having a variable name “check”. This
check depth is determined by the number of cycles needed for each instruction
based on the specific pipelining design. Only when the check is asserted will
the tool start the checking process.
Since this framework is written in SV, it can accommodate any formal
tools that support SV verification with minor changes. The experiments con-
ducted in this thesis uses Cadence JasperGold Formal Property Verification
APP [44] on a large server. However, similar to the issue mentioned in ex-
periments on the synchronized FIFO, the server we use is shared so the data
collected may have some variance due to multiple uses on the shared system.
Therefore, multiple tests have been conducted to present the results on an
average base to make the outcoming data more reliable.
In our work, we will concentrate on the verification of the functional
correctness of the instruction set. The primary assertions checked for each
instruction are listed in Table 4.1. To illustrate, property 3, checking the
52
Figure 4.1: RISC-V formal verification framework diagram
correctness of Rd, write data is under the condition where data in Rs1 and Rs2
are unconstrained. Note that not all of the listed assertions would be covered
in each instruction check.
Due to space limitations, we would only present our detailed elaboration
on one RISC-V implementation, PicoRV32.
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Table 4.1: Assertions checked in formal verification on RISC-V instructions
NO. Description
1 Conditions for entering TRAP vectors
2 Rd address
3 Rd write data
4 Next PC address
5 Rs1 address
6 Rs2 address
7 Data correctness in memory read access
8 Data correctness in memory write access
9 Correct alignment in compact ISAs
4.3 RISC-V Core: PicoRV32
4.3.1 Introduction to Experiment
PicoRV32 is a CPU core that implements the RISC-V RV32IMC ISA.
It can be configured as RV32E (embedded), or any combination of RV32I
(integer), RV32C (compact) and RV32M (multiplication) [53], and an optional
configuration to support IRQ using a simple customized ISA [55].
The average cycles per instruction (CPI) varies among different instruc-
tions, but is usually around 4. The CPI numbers for the individual instructions
can be found in Table 4.2 with the register file configured in dual-port mode.
Based on such information, the check depth is set as 20 so that the processor
is guaranteed to retire the current instruction (except the multiplication and
division) under check.
The verification experiment steps are listed as follows.
1. Make a detailed verification plan on what assert and cover properties
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Table 4.2: CPI numbers for the individual instructions
Instruction CPI
direct jump (jal) 3
ALU reg + immediate 3
ALU reg + reg 3
branch (not taken) 3
memory load 5
memory store 5
branch (taken) 5
indirect jump (jalr) 6
shift operations 4 - 14
multiplication 40 - 72
division 40
should be checked.
2. Instantiate the formal verification framework to accommodate for Pi-
coRV32.
3. Specify waypoint(s) for the DUV (manually or automatically generated)
4. Run FV on the instruction set with waypoints as assertions. Collect data
from FV checks, and find a trace to each waypoint.
5. Run SFV on the same instruction set with customized input sequence
to hit waypoints. If this is the last waypoint – our target state, collect
data from SFV and compare with FV results; otherwise, go back to step
4.
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4.3.2 Verification Ability Improvement
The experiment results for PicoRV32 study case are presented in this
section. Both manually selected and automatic generated waypoints will be
assessed specifically.
In order to quantify the computing performance improvement, we will
use memory and runtime as our performance metrics. Many studies only focus
on one aspect while sacrificing the other. Instead, neither would be ignored in
our study cases and each parameter will be presented in detail. If less runtime
and memory consumption is observed, it suggests this method has more ca-
pacity than isolated FV, or in another word, cover more states within limited
resources. In our experiment, we exclude the situation where stored values can
get flipped by interference such as electromagnetic interference (EMI), that is
to say, our verification only focuses on reachable states starting from the reset
state in the FSM.
4.3.2.1 User-defined Waypoints
In this section, the waypoint is manually selected as the state where the
instruction under check has retired, indicating the state where all computation
is completed.
The same verification environment as the FIFO example in section 2.3
was first used with four Intel E5-2690 CPU and memory size of 8GB. However,
JasperGold is unable to provide determinate FV results without waypoints
with the limited resources on this server. This result indicates that classic FV
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Table 4.3: Verification result of PicoRV32 AND instruction on server S
Runtime/s Memory Usage/GB Line Coverage/%
FV result 386.7 + page fault -
SFV result 88 1.02 87.41
checks requires too many resources since the tool reports a page fault issue
due to low memory. Table 4.3 presents the results of the check for the AND
instruction using both FV and SFV methods. The ‘+’ sign in the FV runtime
entry shows the time that the tool reports a “page fault” when the check has
not been completed yet. Although we are not able to statistically analyze such
results, it is obvious that our waypoint-based SFV is superior to classic FV in
terms of both runtime and memory consumption.
To better quantify the comparison of verification ability between FV
and SFV, we move to the “big” server with 32 Intel Xeon E5-2690 CPUs and
memory size of 378.47GB available. In this condition, we are able to complete
both FV and SFV experiments for all instructions listed on RV32ICM specifi-
cations [53]. Both FV and waypoint-based SFV are applied to the PicoRV32
core to verify the functional correctness as indicated in Table 4.1 of each in-
struction. Note that only the control paths are verified for RV32M, which will
be elaborated on later.
Comparison in terms of runtime and memory consumption is presented
in Figure 4.2. As can be seen from these figures, the improvement is significant:
it is obvious that both runtime and memory usage applying the SFV method
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is much less than those applying the FV method. In fact, our statistical results
show that the average improvement of runtime from FV to SFV is 79%, and
the reduction of memory usage is 94%. At the same time, the line coverage
and signal coverage [3] provided by JasperGold remain the same for the two
methods, indicating that introducing traces to hit waypoints does not have a
significant effect in basic coverage measurements.
We will now discuss verification for RV32M specifically. Due to its
complex arithmetic operations, It will take a lot longer runtime if we include
the data path in verification. To solve this issue, we assume the MUL/DIV
calculation is correct, similar to the idea of black-boxing, and only check the
addresses of Rs1, Rs2 and Rd (source and destination registers), and the control
signals send to the control unit to establish that the instruction has been
correctly executed. If more comprehensive verification is required, the function
unit can be verified separately.
To conclude, the proposed SFV method is proved to be very promising
in expanding formal verification capacity on such large designs.
The original data is given in Appendix B.1 as a reference.
4.3.2.2 Automatically Generated Waypoints
The previous section shows that applying high-level user-defined way-
points in our SFV method can bring us large improvements in verification
ability compared with classic FV. However, though the manually selected way-
points are effective, they require a large amount of time and effort to analyze
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(a) Runtime
(b) Memory Usage
Figure 4.2: Comparison of memory usage and runtime of RISC-V ISAs
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the system and select the proper intermediate states. In this section, the au-
tomatically generated waypoints will be assessed with the PicoRV32 core in
order to prove the effectiveness of the automatic waypoint generation algo-
rithm proposed in Chapter 3. The results in this experiment will be compared
with the case using manually selected waypoints.
With the model already trained by the neural network and the data
gathered from the synthesized PicoRV32 netlist, we follow the same routine
introduced in Chapter 3 and get the score predictions of flip-flops in the Pi-
coRV32 core. The original data is given in Table B.3 attached in Appendix
B.2. Based on the score set, the threshold for CFF is set to 0.8, which delim-
its 5 critical flip-flops in total. These CFFs are then passed to the waypoint
generation tool. The guide report for each CFF is presented in Appendix
B.3, where the number after “L” is the corresponding line in the Verilog code
analyzed by the tool, and the logic expressions after them are the generated
waypoints.
As stated in Chapter 3, human intervention is involved to select the
suitable waypoints based on this guide. In this experiment, the waypoint
below is used to guide the formal engine (no hierarchical information added):
(resetn && cpuregs write && latched rd)
With the same environment as metioned in the previous section, we
run formal checks in JasperGold using 1) FV without waypoints, 2) SFV with
the manually selected waypoint, and 3) SFV with the automatically generated
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waypoint. In order to compare the performance of these three cases, we vi-
sualize the increase in the memory usage as a function of the runtime of the
formal tool pass in Figure 4.3 with the LW instruction as an example. Noted
that the data is not consistent with that in Appendix B.1 because this is from
one experiment result, while the original table shows the average values.
Figure 4.3: Memory usage versus runtime of LW instruction comparison
The results show that using the FV method, the memory usage is nearly
exponential with the increase in runtime, and that of SFV is close to linear.
Besides, the result is similar to the synchronized FIFO example elaborated
in Chapter 3: though both are able to improve the verification performance,
the user-defined waypoint is more effective than its automatic generated coun-
terpart. Due to space limitations, corresponding curves of other instructions,
which all show similar performance changes, will not be presented here. How-
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ever, one problem that has not been resolved is the SFV runs of the DIV set
of instructions. This may be due to the fact that the waypoint we defined is
not necessarily on the path towards the target state; this is an area for future
experiments and analysis. In addition, since this DUV is bug-free, we inten-
tionally added some bugs related to instruction functions. Those bugs have
been captured with our formal verification framework, and the SFV results
show that bugs are covered with less overhead. To illustrate, the number of
cycles needed to find the bug is the same as the number of bounds reduced to
reach the target state. However, we will not elaborate on these experiments
due to space limitation.
4.4 RISC-V Core: Rocket
4.4.1 Introduction to Experiments
Rocket is a 5-stage in-order scalar core generator implemented with
Berkeley’s Chisel, which supports the RV32G and RV64G ISAs. Its pipeline
structure is shown in Figure 4.4. It has one memory management unit (MMU)
that supports virtual memory, a non-blocking data cache, and also a branch
prediction unit. The source code for the Rocket project can be found on the
GitHub repository freechipsproject/rocket-chip.
The main reason why we brought this Rocket core into study, as men-
tioned earlier, is that its RTL code is not human-readable because it is gener-
ated by Chisel. Besides, the generated Verilog file is huge with nearly 200,000
lines. Considering these features, we would like to make an assessment on
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Figure 4.4: The Rocket core pipeline[5]
whether the machine-generated waypoints can be of reasonable value in this
case.
The verification flow for Rocket core is introduced as follows (similar
steps with the PicoRV32 study case are briefly mentioned).
1. Generate RTL code from the Rocket core design implemented in Chisel.
2. Make the verification plan and run rvfi insn checks using the FV method.
3. Find the initial sequence to configure the core correctly (this is different
from the previous example, we will elaborate on this in the next section).
4. Run the automatic waypoint generation tool developed in this thesis for
the Rocket core and select waypoints for SFV test.
5. Find the traces to the specified waypoints using assertions.
6. Run waypoint-based SFV on the supported ISA set with the new trace
to hit the waypoints. Repeat this procedure until the last waypoint –
the target state – is reached.
7. Analyze the results.
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4.4.2 Initial Configuration Sequence
The first round test is conducted the same way as that used for Pi-
coRV32 case. However, when we simply start the FV checks from the reset
state, all properties would find counterexample traces at the very first cycle
after the reset cycles. These counterexamples are obvious false negatives after
investigating the traces provided by JasperGold.
In order to produce correct and comprehensive processor functions,
it is often the case that one needs to initialize the core first by configuring
important registers to proper initial states. As a matter of fact, this actual
initial state is not the same concept as what we have been referring to as the
ones that determined by the reset signal. Instead, it should be considered as
a waypoint, representing the state where the processor is ready to work.
In Rocket, the program counter (PC) is always initialized to 0x2000.
Therefore, we need to make sure the PC is initialized there, and it should
remain at the same address for many cycles before any instructions start to
execute. This is because of the memory system feature that simulates a typ-
ical latency for the DRAM access. This latency is required for loading the
instructions into the cache before executing.
Instruction JAL with specifically calculated offset as its operand is used
here to initialize PC to 0x2000. However, we also need to add a few NOP
instructions before executing the JAL instruction because we need to flush
the pipeline and dump all possible trash data inside the instruction cache.
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In this way, we are able to design an initial configuration sequence to bypass
the initialization and start the SFV checks for the Rocket core from this pre-
configured “waypoint”.
With the initial configuration sequence, we are able to run the SFV
checks for all instructions in RV64I. However, even with the ‘big’ server with
32 CPUs and over 300 GB memory, the tool kept running for 72 hours and
gave non-deterministic results for some properties in the instruction checks.
The situation repeats in other instruction checks but the properties that give
non-deterministic results vary. In formal verification, non-deterministic results
mean that there are neither proofs nor counterexamples found for the property.
A commonly used standard in industrial verification projects is to constrain
the check to be within a certain bound (80 in our experiment). It is be good
enough to conclude that the design is bug-free within this bound.
4.4.3 Automatic Generated Waypoints
As mentioned above, the Rocket core is specifically suitable for auto-
matically generated waypoints because of its large size (nearly 300 thousand
lines) and non-human-readable feature (due to the code being generated by
Berkely’s Chisel compiler). Applying the method presented in Chapter 3, we
have scored all internal flip-flops in the Rocket RTL design. The scoring result
is presented in Table B.4 attached in Appendix B.2.
To delimit critical flip-flops for the Rocket core, the threshold is set to
0.8. We then run the automatic waypoint guide generation tool. One thing
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needs to be mentioned here is that the nickname (defined in Algorithm 1)
searching for Rocket core is slightly modified. To illustrate, the direct connect
combinational logic will be extended to also include the RV with only one logic
operation between CFF and another signal. In addition, a constant ‘Level’
is introduced to inform the tool how many hierarchies it should search. This
hierarchical level can be modified by user to restrain how many nicknames are
found.
The suggested waypoints along with their line information are shown
in Appendix B.2. It can be seen from the waypoint report that the machine-
generated ones are large in number, which requires a lot more effort to select
and order.
4.4.4 Notes for Temporary Results
The experiment results for Rocket core show that some of the properties
checked for functional correctness of each instruction are still non-deterministic
with all optimizations involved. One obstacle is the unresolved conflicts be-
tween the initial sequence and the design. This issue comes from the different
macro definitions in the initial configuration stage and the regular work stage.
We are not able to dynamically change the macros during the verification pro-
cess, so the RISC-V verification framework should take the responsibility of
altering the behavior pattern. This strategy works when we only apply the
initial configuration sequence in the formal checks, but problems occur again
when we try to combine the configuration with the traces found to hit the way-
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point. This should be the most important issue to resolve in order to make
progress in this study case.
In any case, the waypoint-based SFV method, either manual or auto-
matically selected, has been proven to be effective in the previous study cases.
The scope of this target might be beyond the reach of this thesis’s timeline,
but it is still worthy of studying for any related future work. It is also rea-
sonable to make the hypothesis that the efficiency of the RISC-V verification
framework for end-to-end verification needs to be improved for implementa-
tions of large scale processors. We would also recommend that future research
can explore the automation regarding waypoints, not only based on the RTL
code, but also based on the status of the formal engine in real time.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
In general, this thesis has proposed a waypoint-based SFV approach
to extend the capacity of formal tools, which proves to be very effective using
performance metrics of both runtime and memory consumption. The detailed
summary of this thesis is as follows.
1. A waypoint-based SFV method is proposed in this thesis. The waypoint
definition and propagation policy are discussed in detail. The imple-
mentation algorithm flow is presented and experiments are conducted
for a synchronized FIFO to compare the results from classic FV, single
waypoint SFV and multiple waypoint SFV in terms of memory usage
and runtime. The results show that the formal engine capacity can be
greatly improved by introducing waypoints in the verification flow.
2. As a supplement for the cases where manually selected waypoints are
impractical, an automatic waypoint guide generation tool is developed
in this thesis. Nine important features from the synthesized netlists are
collected to form the training data set, and then a full connection neural
network is trained to find the critical flip-flops. These critical flip-flops
are then used to generate waypoint guidance by analyzing the Verilog
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source codes. The proposed SFV flow is run with the automatically gen-
erated waypoints, and the results show that this automation procedure
is effective in helping the formal engine to extend its capacity but not as
good as the user-defined waypoints in our experiments.
3. Two RISC-V cores, PicoRV32 and Rocket, are selected as study cases
to test the effectiveness of our waypoint-based SFV. An expandable and
reusable RISC-V verification framework has been applied to perform end-
to-end ISA verification, circumventing the troubles to look into design
details. Our experiments suggest that the proposed SFV methods is
quite promising for extending the tool capacity for such large designs.
Although being powerful, the methods proposed in this work still have
many aspects that could be improved. Here we list several suggestions on
prospective future work.
1. The instructions verified in this thesis are still a subset of all ISAs sup-
ported. Instructions such as multiplication and floating-point operations
can be verified using more suitable methodologies.
2. More comprehensive coverage metrics, such as state coverage and pair-
wise signal coverage, can be applied to evaluate the waypoint-based SFV
method.
3. The training data set can be expanded further with more designs be-
cause the loss function, though tending to be flat, still shows a trend to
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decrease. More advanced neural network structures and other feature
vectors are also worth further study.
4. The automatic waypoint generation tool can be more intelligent than
just providing guidance. This should involve a comprehensive Verilog
parser and more design specific configurations based on different speci-
fications. Realtime information from the formal engine can also be take
into consideration.
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Appendix A
Important Scripts Used in This Thesis
A.1 TCL Command to Run JasperGold
Listing A.1: Jaspergold setup command (example)
c l e a r −all ;
ana lyze −sv −f v f i l e . f ;
ana lyze −sv −f s v f i l e . f ;
e l a b o r a t e −top { r v f i t e s t b e n c h } −enable sva isunknown
# black−boxing in the e l a bo ra t e s t ep
clock clock ;
r e s e t −express ion r e s e t ;
# re s e t −sequence j g i n i t . s e q ;
# r e s e t −sequence −vcd in i t n ew . v cd
# the above used fo r waypoint based SFV, i n i t i a l sequence can be seq or vcd
f i l e s
# assumption or a b s t r a c t i on s can be made here in add i t i on
prove −all ;
exit
A.2 Cadence Encounter Timing Analysis Script
Listing A.2: get.tcl
s e t a t t r i b u t e hd l s ea r ch path { . /}
s e t a t t r i b u t e l i b s e a r c h p a t h { . /}
s e t a t t r i b u t e l ibrary [ l i s t g s c l 4 5n m . l i b ]
set c u r r e n t d e s i g n DUT
set myFiles [ l i s t DUT.v ]
r ead hd l ${myFiles}
e l a b o r a t e ${ c u r r e n t d e s i g n }
r ead sdc . / c o n s t r a i n t s . s d c
check des i gn −unresolved
repo r t t iming − l int
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# Synthes i z e the des ign to the t a r g e t l i b r a r y
s y n t h e s i z e −to mapped
w r i t e h d l −mapped > ${ c u r r e n t d e s i g n } n e t l i s t . v
puts ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”
puts ” a l l o u t p u t s ”
puts ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”
puts [ a l l o u t p u t s ]
set a l l o u t [ a l l o u t p u t s ]
puts ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”
puts ” a l l r e g i s t e r s ”
puts ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”
puts [ a l l r e g i s t e r s ]
set a l l r e g [ a l l r e g i s t e r s ]
puts ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”
puts ” a l l i n p u t s ”
puts ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”
puts [ a l l i n p u t s ]
set a l l i n [ a l l i n p u t s ]
set fp [ open ” t e s t 2 . r p t ” a+ ]
#$ a l l i n
#$ a l l o u t
for { set a 0} {$a < [ llength $ a l l r e g ]} { incr a} {
set tmp reg [ lindex $ a l l r e g $a ]
regsub −all {\/ de s i gn s \/DUT\/ i n s t a n c e s \ s eq \/} $tmp reg ”” mytmp
puts $fp $mytmp
regsub −all { \ [ [ 0−9 ] ∗ \ ]} $mytmp ”” i n i t k e y
set s ea rch key ”∗”
append s ea rch key $ i n i t k e y
append s ea rch key ”\∗Q∗”
append mytmp ”\/D”
set f an in [ a l l f a n i n −to $mytmp − s t a r tpo in t s on ly ]
set f a n i n v e r b o s e [ a l l f a n i n −to $mytmp ]
regsub −all {\/D} $mytmp {\/CLK} mytmp2
set fanout [ a l l f a n o u t −from $mytmp2 −endpoints only ]
set f anout ve rbose [ a l l f a n o u t −from $mytmp2 ]
set i n key ” ∗port s \ i n∗ ”
puts $fp [ llength [ lsearch −all − i n l ine $ fan in $ in key ] ]
set out key ” ∗port s \ out∗ ”
puts $fp [ llength [ lsearch −all − i n l ine $fanout $out key ] ]
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puts $fp [ llength $ fan in ]
puts $fp [ llength $fanout ]
puts $fp [ llength $ f a n i n v e r b o s e ]
puts $fp [ llength $ fanout ve rbose ]
set f a n i n l o o p [ a l l f a n i n −to $mytmp ]
i f { [ llength [ lsearch −all − i n l ine $ f a n i n l o o p $search key ] ]} then {
puts $fp ”1”} else {puts $fp ”0”}
puts $fp [ llength $ a l l i n ]
puts $fp [ llength $ a l l o u t ]
puts $fp [ llength $ a l l r e g ]
}
puts ” r e g i s t e r s D done”
close $fp
A.3 Other Codes
Other codes that are too large to fit in the appendix can be found on Github
repository: https://github.com/bearichan/thesis_SFV.git
The repository includes:
• Neural Network training model and prediction code
• Automatic Waypoint Guide Generation Tool
• Formal Verification Framework for RISC-V (modified from work [54])
• RTL source codes of the design used to gather the training set data
• The script to source information from Candece RC as well as the raw data
gathered for scoring prediction
A README file can be found via link above illustrating how the files are
origanized and how to use the tools.
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Appendix B
Original Experiment Data
B.1 Original Data of PicoRV32 FV and SFV Experi-
ments
Table B.1: Original data collected for PICORV32 core FV and SFV tests
ISA
name
FV run-
time
FV
mem
usage
SFV run-
time
SFV
mem
usage
line cov-
erage
signal
coverage
runtime
improved
mem
re-
duced
add 1.93 12.453 0.362 0.743 86.22% 70.77% 81% 94%
addi 2.173 13.159 0.314 0.749 85.75% 68.37% 86% 94%
and 2.046 14.75 0.355 0.732 87.41% 72.82% 83% 95%
andi 1.937 12.432 0.38 0.783 85.75% 68.37% 80% 94%
auipc 1.072 6.723 0.382 0.743 84.89% 65.54% 64% 89%
beq 1.387 8.464 0.412 0.704 87.51% 72.91% 70% 92%
bge 1.184 7.629 0.412 0.754 87.51% 72.91% 65% 90%
bgeu 1.011 7.536 0.434 0.784 87.51% 72.91% 57% 90%
blt 1.538 11.789 0.449 0.733 87.51% 72.91% 71% 94%
bltu 1.411 8.209 0.407 0.688 87.51% 72.91% 71% 92%
bne 1.41 7.985 0.425 0.607 87.51% 72.91% 70% 92%
jal 1.438 11.716 0.425 0.668 85.26% 64.11% 70% 94%
jalr 1.617 11.011 0.388 0.785 86.19% 67.21% 76% 93%
lb 2.613 14.549 0.445 0.792 86.29% 67.68% 83% 95%
lbu 1.792 13.664 0.476 0.75 86.29% 67.68% 73% 95%
lh 1.808 11.51 0.411 0.761 86.29% 67.71% 77% 93%
lhu 1.785 8.268 0.368 0.722 86.29% 67.71% 79% 91%
lui 1.169 11.37 0.379 0.84 85.23% 63.95% 68% 93%
lw 1.968 12.635 0.344 0.764 86.29% 67.78% 83% 94%
or 1.772 13.571 0.39 0.687 86.83% 70.18% 78% 95%
ori 2.08 13.959 0.35 0.716 86.18% 67.20% 83% 95%
sb 4.029 27.51 0.417 0.902 86.82% 70.26% 90% 97%
sh 3.88 25.507 0.407 0.741 86.82% 70.26% 90% 97%
sll 2.328 13.587 0.398 0.636 86.84% 67.62% 83% 95%
slli 1.606 13.747 0.362 0.618 86.19% 67.12% 77% 96%
slt 2.116 14.682 0.392 0.729 86.83% 70.18% 81% 95%
slti 1.748 11.458 0.357 0.731 86.18% 67.20% 80% 94%
sltiu 1.747 8.148 0.393 0.697 86.18% 67.20% 78% 91%
sltu 2.414 14.162 0.407 0.71 86.83% 70.18% 83% 95%
sra 2.256 14.375 0.373 0.729 86.84% 67.62% 83% 95%
srai 1.949 9.285 0.367 0.575 86.19% 67.12% 81% 94%
srl 1.979 13.513 0.371 0.627 86.84% 67.62% 81% 95%
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srli 1.814 11.475 0.374 0.607 86.19% 67.12% 79% 95%
sub 1.832 14.861 0.338 0.788 86.83% 70.18% 82% 95%
sw 1.389 12.878 0.401 0.705 86.82% 70.26% 71% 95%
xor 1.87 13.491 0.424 0.738 86.83% 70.18% 77% 95%
xori 1.341 12.473 0.416 0.748 86.18% 67.20% 69% 94%
c add 1.722 14.004 0.321 0.668 86.81% 70.12% 81% 95%
c addi 2.04 14.497 0.303 0.718 86.17% 67.16% 85% 95%
c addi4spn 1.508 12.423 0.336 0.66 86.17% 67.16% 78% 95%
c addi16sp 2.061 15.081 0.32 0.69 86.17% 67.16% 84% 95%
c and 1.942 13.8 0.327 0.708 86.82% 70.13% 83% 95%
c andi 2.142 15.808 0.344 0.79 86.10% 67.17% 84% 95%
c beqz 1.612 13.707 0.348 0.684 86.18% 67.16% 78% 95%
c bnez 1.533 13.5 0.345 0.762 86.18% 67.16% 77% 94%
c j 1.709 13.498 0.336 0.773 85.26% 64.07% 80% 94%
c jal 1.439 11.753 0.308 0.735 85.26% 64.07% 79% 94%
c jalr 1.804 14.566 0.345 0.952 86.17% 67.04% 81% 93%
c jr 2.387 14.518 0.367 0.864 85.90% 64.85% 85% 94%
c li 1.517 13.785 0.335 0.771 85.26% 64.10% 78% 94%
c lui 1.566 10.287 0.333 0.777 85.26% 64.10% 79% 92%
c lw 2.666 14.79 0.346 0.728 86.29% 67.76% 87% 95%
c lwsp 2.213 13.609 0.379 0.735 86.27% 67.74% 83% 95%
c mv 1.389 13.71 0.349 0.7 85.90% 67.04% 75% 95%
c or 2.294 15.929 0.387 0.683 86.82% 70.13% 83% 96%
c slli 1.229 7.625 0.305 0.648 86.17% 67.04% 75% 92%
c srai 1.542 8.365 0.335 0.598 86.18% 67.05% 78% 93%
c srli 1.237 4.797 0.338 0.637 86.18% 67.05% 73% 87%
c sub 1.447 10.18 0.293 0.731 86.82% 70.13% 80% 93%
c sw 0.799 7.413 0.313 0.694 86.82% 70.24% 61% 91%
c swsp 1.182 10.51 0.331 0.697 86.82% 70.22% 72% 93%
c xor 2.013 14.642 0.328 0.718 86.82% 70.13% 84% 95%
mul 2.334 14.655 0.35 0.839 85.44% 62.47% 85% 94%
mulh 2.61 14.688 0.357 0.884 85.44% 62.47% 86% 94%
mulhsu 2.365 14.646 0.357 0.883 85.44% 62.47% 85% 94%
mulhu 2.087 13.779 0.351 0.781 85.44% 62.47% 83% 94%
rem 2.657 16.664 0.391 1.614 85.44% 62.47% 85% 90%
remu 2.305 14.505 0.372 1.47 85.44% 62.47% 84% 90%
div 2.614 14.574 0.393 1.686 85.44% 62.47% 85% 88%
divu 2.354 14.596 0.4 1.354 85.44% 62.47% 83% 91%
B.2 Neural Network Training Results
Table B.2: Neural network training result for synchronized FIFO
signal name Hier Rin Rout >> R R << >> Rv Rv << Loop Len score ref
full reg 0 0 0.100 0.058 0.791 0.419 6.465 1 1 0.999 1
dffw1 0 0.08 0.000 0.006 0.814 0.012 6.756 0 1 0.999 0.8
dffw2 0 0 0.000 0.006 0.808 0.017 6.762 0 1 0.999 0.8
wr reg 0 0 0.000 0.011 0.194 0.088 1.644 1 4 0.956 0.8
dffr1 0 0.08 0.000 0.006 0.116 0.012 4.390 0 1 0.658 0.8
dffr2 0 0 0.000 0.006 0.110 0.017 4.395 0 1 0.585 0.8
rd reg 0 0 0.000 0.011 0.018 0.083 0.987 1 4 0.411 0.8
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empty reg 0 0 0.100 0.081 0.047 1.267 0.262 1 1 0.328 1
regarray[1] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.044 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[9] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.046 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[3] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.046 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[5] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.046 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[0] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.043 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[7] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.047 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[13] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.047 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[11] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.047 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[4] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.044 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[8] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.044 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[2] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.044 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[15] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.049 0.015 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[10] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.046 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[12] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.046 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[6] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.046 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
regarray[14] 0 0.01 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.047 0.019 1 8 0.046 0
out 0 0 0.013 0.017 0.002 0.180 0.010 1 8 0.034 0
Table B.3: Neural network training result for PicoRV32
signal name Hier Rin Rout >> R R << >> Rv Rv << Loop Len score
latched branch 0 0.01 0.098 0.054 0.568 0.86 5.428 1 1 0.995
latched store 0 0.01 0.098 0.056 0.568 0.867 5.399 1 1 0.995
latched stalu 0 0.01 0 0.003 0.537 0.019 2.271 1 1 0.985
latched rd 0 0.002 0 0.001 0.101 0.005 0.79 1 5 0.928
cpu state 0 0.003 0 0.004 0.079 0.031 0.952 1 7 0.909
mem state 0 0.01 0.003 0.003 0.048 0.04 0.784 1 2 0.731
mem do
wdata
0 0.02 0.003 0.008 0.096 0.069 1.558 1 1 0.719
mem do
rdata
0 0.02 0.003 0.008 0.079 0.063 1.471 1 1 0.682
mem valid 0 0.02 0.003 0.005 0.078 0.065 1.514 1 1 0.677
mem do
prefetch
0 0.02 0.101 0.007 0.077 0.051 1.494 1 1 0.666
mem do rinst 0 0.02 0.101 0.083 0.095 1.043 1.787 1 1 0.62
decoder
trigger
0 0.02 0 0.059 0.092 0.94 1.124 0 1 0.619
is beq bne
blt bge bltu
bgeu
0 0.088 0 0.012 0.029 0.096 0.238 1 1 0.555
decoder
pseudo
trigger
0 0.02 0 0.008 0.038 0.069 0.436 0 1 0.552
trap 0 0.01 0.003 0.004 0.037 0.026 0.28 0 1 0.537
is alu
reg imm
0 0.088 0 0.012 0.023 0.096 0.157 1 1 0.486
is sb sh sw 0 0.088 0 0.012 0.02 0.098 0.138 1 1 0.454
mem word-
size
0 0.01 0.046 0.004 0.025 0.037 0.304 1 2 0.445
is lui auipc
jal jalr addi
add sub
0 0 0 0.005 0.017 0.024 0.168 0 1 0.371
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instr jal 0 0.088 0 0.012 0.074 0.096 4.843 1 1 0.357
latched is lb 0 0.02 0 0.007 0.013 0.06 0.097 1 1 0.353
latched is lh 0 0.02 0 0.007 0.013 0.06 0.119 1 1 0.35
latched is lu 0 0.02 0 0.007 0.013 0.06 0.144 1 1 0.346
is alu reg reg 0 0.088 0 0.012 0.007 0.097 0.055 1 1 0.283
instr jalr 0 0.118 0 0.015 0.058 0.115 4.664 1 1 0.243
is lb lh
lw lbu lhu
0 0.088 0 0.012 0.058 0.097 4.65 1 1 0.235
is sll srl sra 0 0 0 0.007 0.003 0.048 0.017 1 1 0.232
is sltiu
bltu sltu
0 0 0 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.021 0 1 0.232
is slti
blt slt
0 0 0 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.022 0 1 0.231
mem instr 0 0.01 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.046 0.004 1 1 0.221
is lbu lhu lw 0 0 0 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.005 0 1 0.212
is compare 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.001 0.021 0.004 0 1 0.205
reg sh 0 0.002 0 0.01 0.008 0.079 0.192 1 5 0.201
mem wstrb 0 0.002 0.001 0.002 0 0.018 0.001 1 4 0.196
instr sub 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.056 0.041 4.703 1 1 0.193
instr andi 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.055 0.024 4.728 1 1 0.19
decoded rs2 0 0.006 0 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.475 1 5 0.188
instr and 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.055 0.041 4.727 1 1 0.187
instr ori 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.055 0.025 4.774 1 1 0.185
instr or 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.055 0.042 4.773 1 1 0.183
instr xori 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.055 0.026 4.798 1 1 0.182
instr xor 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.055 0.043 4.798 1 1 0.18
instr auipc 0 0.088 0 0.012 0.05 0.097 4.652 1 1 0.179
instr lui 0 0.088 0 0.012 0.05 0.096 4.672 1 1 0.177
instr rdcycle 0 0 0 0.015 0.056 0.079 4.816 1 1 0.177
instr rdcycleh 0 0 0 0.015 0.056 0.08 4.838 1 1 0.175
instr rdinstr 0 0 0 0.015 0.056 0.08 4.844 1 1 0.175
instr rdinstrh 0 0 0 0.015 0.056 0.081 4.864 1 1 0.173
decoded rs1 0 0.006 0 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.518 1 5 0.171
decoded rd 0 0.006 0 0.001 0 0.011 0.002 1 5 0.127
instr beq 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.041 0.027 4.563 1 1 0.114
instr bge 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.041 0.025 4.564 1 1 0.114
instr bgeu 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.041 0.024 4.563 1 1 0.114
instr bne 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.041 0.026 4.568 1 1 0.114
instr slti 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.04 0.026 4.544 1 1 0.11
instr sltiu 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.04 0.025 4.544 1 1 0.11
instr slt 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.04 0.043 4.544 1 1 0.109
instr sltu 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.04 0.042 4.544 1 1 0.109
instr blt 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.04 0.026 4.547 1 1 0.108
instr bltu 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.04 0.025 4.547 1 1 0.108
instr lb 0 0 0 0.004 0.04 0.024 4.55 1 1 0.108
instr lbu 0 0 0 0.004 0.04 0.023 4.553 1 1 0.108
instr lh 0 0 0 0.004 0.04 0.02 4.55 1 1 0.108
instr lhu 0 0 0 0.004 0.04 0.022 4.553 1 1 0.108
instr addi 0 0.01 0 0.004 0.04 0.027 4.559 1 1 0.107
instr lw 0 0 0 0.004 0.04 0.023 4.545 1 1 0.106
instr add 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.04 0.044 4.559 1 1 0.105
instr sb 0 0 0 0.004 0.04 0.024 4.551 1 1 0.105
instr sh 0 0 0 0.004 0.04 0.02 4.555 1 1 0.105
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instr sw 0 0 0 0.004 0.039 0.023 4.553 1 1 0.103
instr sll 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.039 0.043 4.591 1 1 0.101
is lui auipc
jal
0 0 0 0.002 0.038 0.007 4.593 0 1 0.101
instr slli 0 0 0 0.007 0.039 0.037 4.589 1 1 0.1
instr srl 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.039 0.042 4.624 1 1 0.099
instr sra 0 0.01 0 0.008 0.039 0.043 4.632 1 1 0.098
instr srai 0 0 0 0.007 0.039 0.037 4.63 1 1 0.097
instr srli 0 0 0 0.007 0.039 0.037 4.623 1 1 0.097
is slli
srli srai
0 0 0 0.007 0.038 0.048 4.536 1 1 0.097
is jalr addi
slti sltiu xori
ori andi
0 0 0 0.004 0.038 0.042 4.577 1 1 0.096
decoded
imm uj
0 0.003 0 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.006 1 10 0.033
alu out q 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.004 0 32 0.001
reg out 0 0.002 0 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.004 0 32 0.001
cpuregs[10] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[11] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[12] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[13] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[14] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[15] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[16] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[17] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[18] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[19] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[1] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[20] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[21] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[22] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[23] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[24] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[25] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[26] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[27] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[28] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[29] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[2] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[30] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[31] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[3] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[4] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[5] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[6] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[7] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[8] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
cpuregs[9] 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.003 0.001 1 32 0.001
decoded imm 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 1 32 0.001
mem addr 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 1 30 0.001
mem rdata q 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.002 1 32 0.001
mem wdata 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 1 32 0.001
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reg next pc 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.013 0.003 1 31 0.001
reg op1 0 0.001 0 0.002 0 0.02 0.004 1 32 0.001
reg op2 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.012 0.004 1 32 0.001
reg pc 0 0 0 0 0.008 0.001 0.028 1 31 0.001
count cycle 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.002 1 64 0
count instr 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.001 1 64 0
Table B.4: Neural network training result for Rocket Core
signal name Hier Rin Rout >> R R << >> Rv Rv << Loop Len score
core/wb reg inst 1 0 0 0.001 0.295 0.004 2.891 1 17 0.997
core/wb
ctrl mem
1 0 0 0.001 0.408 0.004 6.396 1 1 0.977
core/wb
reg replay
1 0 0 0.003 0.408 0.023 6.357 1 1 0.977
core/wb
reg xcpt
1 0 0 0.005 0.408 0.034 6.394 1 1 0.977
core/wb
reg valid
1 0 0 0.005 0.408 0.037 6.991 1 1 0.977
core/wb
ctrl wxd
1 0 0 0.001 0.406 0.004 6.860 1 1 0.976
core/wb
ctrl csr
1 0 0 0.001 0.382 0.004 1.450 1 3 0.968
dtim adapter
/state
1 0 0 0.004 0.034 0.041 0.226 1 3 0.700
core/div /state 2 0 0 0.001 0.039 0.017 0.658 1 3 0.628
dcache/s2
req cmd
1 0 0 0.014 0.043 0.146 0.302 1 5 0.626
dcache/s2
valid pre xcpt
1 0 0 0.004 0.043 0.029 0.243 1 1 0.598
core/mem
reg valid
1 0 0 0.005 0.103 0.036 3.935 1 1 0.596
dcache/pstore1
held
1 0 0 0.003 0.041 0.032 0.223 1 1 0.592
dcache/ T 602 1 0 0 0.014 0.043 0.140 0.238 1 1 0.585
frontend/fq/
T 60 0
2 0 0 0.007 0.062 0.056 0.562 1 1 0.585
dcache/pstore2
valid
1 0 0 0.003 0.041 0.033 0.326 1 1 0.585
dcache/s2
req phys
1 0 0 0.014 0.043 0.143 0.247 1 1 0.584
frontend/fq/
T 60 4
2 0 0 0.007 0.062 0.054 0.513 1 1 0.584
dcache/ T 2984 1 0 0 0.014 0.043 0.147 0.247 1 1 0.584
dcache/s2 hit
state state
1 0 0 0.017 0.043 0.160 0.238 1 1 0.582
dcache/ T
2986 ma st
1 0 0 0.018 0.043 0.186 0.245 1 1 0.579
dcache/ T
2986 ma ld
1 0 0 0.019 0.043 0.187 0.245 1 1 0.579
dcache/ T
2986 ae st
1 0 0 0.018 0.043 0.187 0.244 1 1 0.579
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dcache/ T
2986 ae ld
1 0 0 0.019 0.043 0.187 0.244 1 1 0.579
core/mem reg
flush pipe
1 0 0 0.001 0.037 0.006 0.355 1 1 0.576
dcache/s1 valid 1 0 0 0.014 0.039 0.154 0.308 1 1 0.566
dcache/ un-
cachedInFlight
0
1 0 0 0.005 0.028 0.034 0.152 1 1 0.549
buffer 1/
Queue/value
2 0 0 0.001 0.043 0.005 0.223 1 1 0.540
buffer 1/
Queue/ T 39
2 0 0 0.003 0.043 0.019 0.222 1 1 0.539
buffer 1/
Queue/value 1
2 0 0 0.003 0.043 0.017 0.309 1 1 0.535
buffer/Queue/
value
2 0 0 0.001 0.042 0.005 0.215 1 1 0.535
buffer/Queue/
T 39
2 0 0 0.001 0.042 0.008 0.215 1 1 0.535
dtim adapter/
acq param
1 0 0 0.004 0.023 0.039 0.128 1 3 0.535
dtim adapter/
acq opcode
1 0 0 0.004 0.023 0.039 0.129 1 3 0.535
buffer/Queue/
value 1
2 0 0 0.001 0.042 0.006 0.298 1 1 0.532
frontend/fq/
T 60 3
2 0 0 0.007 0.037 0.058 0.281 1 1 0.506
frontend/fq/
T 60 1
2 0 0 0.007 0.037 0.057 0.342 1 1 0.502
frontend/fq/
T 60 2
2 0 0 0.007 0.037 0.058 0.341 1 1 0.501
dcache/ block-
Uncached-
Grant
1 0 0 0.003 0.023 0.035 0.219 1 1 0.484
buffer 1/Queue
1/value
2 0 0 0.001 0.027 0.006 0.141 1 1 0.471
buffer 1/Queue
1/ T 39
2 0 0 0.001 0.027 0.008 0.140 1 1 0.471
buffer/Queue
1/ value
2 0 0 0.001 0.026 0.006 0.138 1 1 0.467
buffer 1/Queue 1/
value 1
2 0 0 0.001 0.027 0.006 0.194 1 1 0.467
buffer/Queue
1/ T 39
2 0 0 0.001 0.026 0.012 0.137 1 1 0.466
core/ex reg
replay
1 0 0 0.004 0.038 0.043 0.358 0 1 0.463
buffer/Queue
1/value 1
2 0 0 0.001 0.026 0.010 0.191 1 1 0.462
core/ex reg
xcpt interrupt
1 0 0 0.005 0.038 0.046 0.356 0 1 0.461
dcache/s1
req typ
1 0 0 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.112 1 3 0.443
core/ex reg
valid
1 0 0 0.035 0.079 0.563 3.755 1 1 0.438
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frontend/icache/
s2 valid
2 0 0 0.001 0.017 0.005 0.207 1 1 0.401
frontend/ T 222 1 0 0 0.002 0.013 0.012 0.106 1 1 0.367
frontend/s2 valid 1 0 0 0.002 0.013 0.012 0.108 1 1 0.367
frontend/s2
speculative
1 0 0 0.002 0.013 0.009 0.112 1 1 0.367
core/ex reg
rs lsb 1
1 0 0 0.045 0.024 0.706 0.419 1 2 0.366
frontend/s2 tlb
resp ae inst
1 0 0 0.006 0.013 0.032 0.112 1 1 0.359
core/mem reg
xcpt interrupt
1 0 0 0.003 0.024 0.025 0.183 0 1 0.358
core/csr/
T 1242
2 0 0 0.000 0.012 0.006 0.100 1 1 0.356
core/mem
reg rvc
1 0 0 0.001 0.012 0.006 0.079 1 1 0.356
frontend/
icache/ invali-
dated
2 0 0 0.001 0.012 0.006 0.107 1 1 0.355
core/csr/
reg wfi
2 0 0 0.001 0.012 0.013 0.100 1 1 0.354
core/mem
reg replay
1 0 0 0.005 0.023 0.035 0.180 0 1 0.354
core/mem
ctrl csr
1 0 0 0.001 0.042 0.006 3.382 1 3 0.348
core/ex reg rs
bypass 1
1 0 0 0.033 0.024 0.571 0.375 1 1 0.343
core/mem
ctrl jalr
1 0 0 0.001 0.055 0.006 3.550 1 1 0.341
core/mem
ctrl jal
1 0 0 0.001 0.054 0.006 3.476 1 1 0.341
core/mem
ctrl branch
1 0 0 0.001 0.054 0.006 3.480 1 1 0.340
core/div/ resHi 2 0 0 0.002 0.012 0.028 0.226 1 1 0.328
dcache/s1
req cmd
1 0 0 0.000 0.026 0.002 0.182 1 5 0.328
fragmenter 1/
Repeater/full
2 0 0 0.002 0.009 0.017 0.080 1 1 0.313
core/ex ctrl
sel imm
1 0 0 0.033 0.012 0.567 0.165 1 3 0.302
core/wb ctrl
div
1 0 0 0.001 0.047 0.004 3.400 1 1 0.286
dcache/ T 1213 1 0 0 0.003 0.016 0.021 0.082 0 1 0.283
core/ibuf/buf
replay
2 0 0 0.010 0.009 0.230 0.058 1 1 0.279
frontend/icache
/refill valid
2 0 0 0.002 0.005 0.016 0.029 1 1 0.277
core/ibuf/
nBufValid
2 0 0 0.010 0.009 0.230 0.145 1 1 0.264
core/ex ctrl csr 1 0 0 0.032 0.041 0.567 3.381 1 3 0.255
dtim adapter
/acq size
1 0 0 0.004 0.000 0.039 0.002 1 2 0.254
core/ex ctrl
mem
1 0 0 0.032 0.054 0.564 3.597 1 1 0.252
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frontend/ T 241 1 0 0 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.108 0 1 0.249
core/wb reg
flush pipe
1 0 0 0.005 0.043 0.038 3.389 1 1 0.248
core/mem reg
xcpt
1 0 0 0.005 0.013 0.038 0.121 0 1 0.244
core/ex ctrl
mem type
1 0 0 0.033 0.008 0.565 0.131 1 3 0.244
core/mem
ctrl wxd
1 0 0 0.001 0.042 0.007 3.395 1 1 0.244
core/mem
ctrl div
1 0 0 0.001 0.042 0.007 3.382 1 1 0.241
core/mem
ctrl mem
1 0 0 0.001 0.042 0.006 3.385 1 1 0.240
core/blocked 1 0 0 0.001 0.041 0.004 3.380 1 1 0.240
core/mem reg
slow bypass
1 0 0 0.001 0.041 0.007 3.382 1 1 0.239
core/ex ctrl
sel alu1
1 0 0 0.038 0.012 0.794 0.155 1 2 0.238
core/ex ctrl
sel alu2
1 0 0 0.037 0.012 0.794 0.179 1 2 0.236
tlMasterXbar/
T 1111 1
1 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.054 1 1 0.233
core/csr/reg
mstatus mie
2 0 0 0.003 0.002 0.054 0.017 1 1 0.230
core/csr/reg
mstatus mpie
2 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.054 0.014 1 1 0.229
tlMasterXbar/
T 1111 0
1 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.082 1 1 0.229
core/mem ctrl
fence i
1 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.002 1 1 0.228
buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 opcode[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 1 1 0.226
core/div/ isHi 2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 1 1 0.226
buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 opcode[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 1 1 0.226
core/wb ctrl
fence i
1 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.002 1 1 0.226
frontend/s1
speculative
1 0 0 0.002 0.001 0.016 0.003 1 1 0.226
buffer 1/Queue 1/
T 35 opcode[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 1 0.223
buffer 1/Queue 1/
T 35 opcode[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 1 0.223
core/ex ctrl rxs2 1 0 0 0.032 0.012 0.564 0.208 1 1 0.221
core/div/req dw 2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.033 1 1 0.219
tlMasterXbar/
T 1026
1 0 0 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.076 1 1 0.218
core/ex ctrl
alu fn
1 0 0 0.037 0.012 0.798 0.083 1 4 0.217
frontend/fq/
T 82 4 replay
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.055 0.002 1 1 0.214
frontend/fq/
T 82 4
xcpt ae inst
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.055 0.002 1 1 0.214
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frontend/fq/
T 82 1
xcpt ae inst
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 1 0.213
frontend/fq/
T 82 3 replay
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 1 0.213
core/mem br
taken
1 0 0 0.077 0.054 0.941 3.480 1 1 0.213
frontend/fq/
T 82 1 replay
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 1 0.213
frontend/fq/
T 82 3
xcpt ae inst
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 1 0.213
frontend/fq/
T 82 2 replay
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 1 0.213
frontend/fq/
T 82 2 xcpt
ae inst
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.062 0.003 1 1 0.213
fragmenter 1/
T 222
1 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.017 0.028 1 3 0.213
frontend/fq/
T 82 0
xcpt ae inst
2 0 0 0.007 0.000 0.060 0.002 1 1 0.212
frontend/fq/
T 82 0 replay
2 0 0 0.007 0.000 0.061 0.002 1 1 0.211
fragmenter 1/
T 323
1 0 0 0.003 0.001 0.029 0.014 1 3 0.199
dcache/ un-
cachedReqs
0 addr
1 0 0 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.002 1 3 0.197
dcache/ un-
cachedReqs
0 typ
1 0 0 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.003 1 3 0.197
fragmenter 1
/ T 224
1 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.002 1 3 0.196
frontend/icache
/s2 tl error
2 0 0 0.017 0.000 0.140 0.001 1 1 0.195
core/div/neg out 2 0 0 0.026 0.001 0.144 0.006 1 1 0.195
core/ex reg rs
lsb 0
1 0 0 0.049 0.012 0.929 0.381 1 2 0.192
dcache/s2
req typ
1 0 0 0.015 0.001 0.147 0.064 1 3 0.190
core/ibuf/buf
xcpt ae inst
2 0 0 0.010 0.000 0.230 0.002 1 1 0.184
fragmenter 1/
Repeater/
saved size
2 0 0 0.002 0.009 0.017 0.045 1 3 0.180
fragmenter 1/
Repeater/
saved param
2 0 0 0.002 0.009 0.017 0.046 1 3 0.180
fragmenter 1/
Repeater/
saved opcode
2 0 0 0.002 0.009 0.017 0.047 1 3 0.180
core/ex ctrl
div
1 0 0 0.032 0.042 0.565 3.389 1 1 0.179
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core/csr/
reg misa
2 0 0 0.003 0.002 0.049 0.018 1 2 0.175
core/ex ctrl jalr 1 0 0 0.033 0.041 0.565 3.381 1 1 0.174
core/ex ctrl
wxd
1 0 0 0.033 0.041 0.564 3.390 1 1 0.174
core/id reg fence 1 0 0 0.032 0.041 0.565 3.380 1 1 0.173
core/ex reg rs
bypass 0
1 0 0 0.039 0.012 0.792 0.389 1 1 0.173
core/id reg pause 1 0 0 0.033 0.041 0.598 3.379 1 1 0.170
buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 source
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 1 2 0.163
buffer/Queue/
T 35 source
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 2 0.160
buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 corrupt
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 2 0.160
core/ex ctrl
alu dw
1 0 0 0.038 0.006 0.793 0.037 1 1 0.153
frontend/
icache/s2 hit
2 0 0 0.017 0.017 0.138 0.206 0 1 0.142
core/ex ctrl
mem cmd
1 0 0 0.033 0.001 0.564 0.007 1 1 0.140
core/ex reg
load use
1 0 0 0.032 0.001 0.566 0.007 1 1 0.139
core/ex ctrl
fence i
1 0 0 0.032 0.001 0.564 0.002 1 1 0.137
core/ex ctrl jal 1 0 0 0.032 0.001 0.564 0.002 1 1 0.137
core/ex ctrl
branch
1 0 0 0.033 0.001 0.566 0.003 1 1 0.137
core/ex reg
flush pipe
1 0 0 0.033 0.001 0.582 0.002 1 1 0.135
frontend/
icache/ T 154
2 0 0 0.001 0.012 0.004 0.179 0 1 0.123
frontend/
s1 valid
1 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.001 0 1 0.120
dcacheArb/
T 212
1 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0 1 0.119
dcache/ doUn-
cachedResp
1 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 0 1 0.119
core/ T 1189 1 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0 1 0.119
dcacheArb
/ T 210
1 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.051 0 1 0.119
core/csr/reg mie 2 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.040 0.019 1 3 0.117
core/ex reg rvc 1 0 0 0.040 0.001 0.791 0.009 1 1 0.117
frontend/icache/
s1 valid
2 0 0 0.001 0.011 0.006 0.080 0 1 0.116
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 opcode[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 1 3 0.111
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 opcode[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 1 3 0.111
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 param[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 1 3 0.111
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 param[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 1 3 0.111
85
buffer/Queue/
T 35 size[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer 1/Queue 1/
T 35 size[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer/Queue/
T 35 opcode[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer/Queue/
T 35 param[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 size[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 size[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer 1/Queue
1/ T 35 size[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer/Queue/
T 35 size[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer/Queue/
T 35 opcode[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 3 0.109
buffer/Queue/
T 35 param[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.002 1 3 0.109
dcache/mask 1 0 0 0.003 0.025 0.035 0.144 1 8 0.084
dcache/
pstore1 mask
1 0 0 0.014 0.025 0.144 0.146 1 8 0.084
core/mem
reg cause
1 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.003 1 5 0.077
core/wb
reg cause
1 0 0 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.026 1 5 0.076
core/ex reg xcpt 1 0 0 0.040 0.000 0.788 0.002 0 1 0.074
core/ex
reg cause
1 0 0 0.035 0.001 0.568 0.003 1 5 0.072
buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 size[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 4 0.072
buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 size[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 4 0.072
dtim adapter
/acq mask
1 0 0 0.004 0.023 0.039 0.121 1 8 0.071
intsink/ Syn-
chronizer-
ShiftReg
w1 d3/ sync 2
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0 1 0.068
intsink/ Syn-
chronizer-
ShiftReg
w1 d3/ sync 1
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0 1 0.068
intsink/ Syn-
chronizer-
ShiftReg
w1 d3/ sync 0
2 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0 1 0.067
core/csr/ T 241 2 0 0 0.002 0.013 0.041 0.103 1 6 0.061
core/csr/ T 251 2 0 0 0.003 0.013 0.042 0.103 1 6 0.061
core/csr/
reg mcause
2 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.012 1 5 0.049
dcache/s1
req tag
1 0 0 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 1 6 0.046
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dcache/ un-
cachedReqs
0 tag
1 0 0 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.003 1 6 0.046
dcache/s2
req tag
1 0 0 0.015 0.001 0.148 0.003 1 6 0.045
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 source[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 5 0.045
buffer 1/
Queue 1/
T 35 source[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 5 0.045
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 source[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 5 0.045
buffer 1/
Queue 1/
T 35 source[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 5 0.045
core/div/req tag 2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 1 5 0.045
fragmenter 1
/Repeater/
saved source
2 0 0 0.002 0.000 0.017 0.002 1 5 0.044
dcache/
pstore2 addr
1 0 0 0.003 0.025 0.035 0.143 1 11 0.043
dcache/
pstore1 addr
1 0 0 0.014 0.025 0.144 0.143 1 11 0.037
dtim adapter/
acq source
1 0 0 0.004 0.010 0.039 0.053 1 9 0.022
tlMasterXbar/
T 1015
1 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.097 1 8 0.018
core/div/count 2 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.009 0.019 1 7 0.017
dcache/ T 1283 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.035 0.003 1 8 0.016
dcache/ T 1289 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.035 0.003 1 8 0.016
dcache/ T 1295 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.035 0.003 1 8 0.016
dcache/ T 1301 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.034 0.003 1 8 0.016
dcache/ T 1307 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.034 0.003 1 8 0.016
dcache/ T 1313 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.034 0.003 1 8 0.016
dcache/ T 1319 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.034 0.003 1 8 0.016
dcache/ T 1325 1 0 0 0.003 0.000 0.034 0.003 1 8 0.016
frontend/
icache/ T 171
2 0 0 0.002 0.014 0.019 0.150 1 9 0.014
dcache/ T 2726 1 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.027 0.036 1 9 0.013
buffer/Queue/
T 35 mask[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 8 0.009
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 mask[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 8 0.009
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 mask[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 8 0.009
buffer/Queue/
T 35 mask[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 8 0.009
frontend/fq/
T 82 0 data
2 0 0 0.007 0.062 0.060 0.512 1 32 0.003
core/ibuf/
buf data
2 0 0 0.010 0.007 0.230 0.042 1 16 0.001
core/mem
reg inst
1 0 0 0.001 0.019 0.006 0.746 1 25 0.001
core/ex reg inst 1 0 0 0.033 0.009 0.572 0.690 1 25 0.000
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core/mem
reg pc
1 0 0 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.054 1 33 0.000
dcache/
s1 req addr
1 0 0 0.007 0.011 0.035 0.068 1 34 0.000
frontend/icache/
refill addr
2 0 0 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.026 1 26 0.000
frontend/s1 pc 1 0 0 0.005 0.003 0.028 0.020 1 33 0.000
dtim adapter
/acq address
1 0 0 0.004 0.000 0.039 0.002 1 32 0.000
core/ T 1320 1 0 0 0.004 0.041 0.034 3.391 1 31 0.000
frontend/ s2 pc 1 0 0 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.003 1 33 0.000
core/wb reg pc 1 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003 1 33 0.000
dcache/s2
req addr
1 0 0 0.014 0.001 0.145 0.010 1 32 0.000
core/ex reg pc 1 0 0 0.035 0.001 0.567 0.008 1 33 0.000
core/csr/
reg mtvec
2 0 0 0.002 0.001 0.040 0.012 1 31 0.000
buffer/Queue/
T 35 address[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 32 0.000
frontend/icache/
s2 dout 0
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 32 0.000
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 address[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 32 0.000
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 address[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 32 0.000
buffer/Queue/
T 35 address[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 32 0.000
fragmenter 1/
Repeater/
saved address
2 0 0 0.002 0.000 0.017 0.002 1 32 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 4 data
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.055 0.002 1 32 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 1 data
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 32 0.000
frontend
/fq/ T 82
3 data
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 32 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 2 data
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.062 0.003 1 32 0.000
core/csr
/reg mepc
2 0 0 0.002 0.002 0.040 0.016 1 33 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 0 pc
2 0 0 0.007 0.002 0.061 0.018 1 33 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 4 pc
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.055 0.002 1 33 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 1 pc
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 33 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 3 pc
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 33 0.000
frontend/fq/
T 82 2 pc
2 0 0 0.007 0.001 0.061 0.003 1 33 0.000
core/ibuf
/buf pc
2 0 0 0.010 0.000 0.230 0.002 1 32 0.000
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core/csr/
reg mtval
2 0 0 0.001 0.002 0.041 0.015 1 34 0.000
core/csr/ T 244 2 0 0 0.008 0.006 0.067 0.045 1 58 0.000
core/csr/ T 254 2 0 0 0.008 0.006 0.068 0.046 1 58 0.000
core/wb
reg wdata
1 0 0 0.011 0.007 0.070 0.046 1 64 0.000
dcache/s2 data 1 0 0 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.028 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[18] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[22] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[28] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[2] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[30] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.077 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[4] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/mem
reg rs2
1 0 0 0.004 0.000 0.033 0.002 1 64 0.000
dtim adapter
/ T 238
1 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[0] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[10] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[11] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[12] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[13] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[16] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[17] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[19] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[1] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[20] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[21] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[23] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[24] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[25] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[27] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[29] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[3] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[5] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[6] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[7] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[9] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
dtim adapter
/acq data
1 0 0 0.004 0.000 0.039 0.001 1 64 0.000
dcache/
pstore1 data
1 0 0 0.014 0.001 0.144 0.004 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[14] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[15] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[8] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.080 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ T 525[26] 1 0 0 0.009 0.001 0.079 0.008 1 64 0.000
core/ex reg
rs msb 1
1 0 0 0.043 0.001 0.699 0.010 1 62 0.000
core/ex reg
rs msb 0
1 0 0 0.048 0.001 0.923 0.017 1 62 0.000
core/div /divi-
sor
2 0 0 0.013 0.007 0.072 0.072 1 65 0.000
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buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 data[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 64 0.000
buffer/Queue 1/
T 35 data[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 64 0.000
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 data[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 64 0.000
buffer 1/Queue/
T 35 data[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 64 0.000
buffer 1/
Queue 1
/ T 35 data[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 64 0.000
buffer 1/
Queue 1/
T 35 data[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 64 0.000
frontend/icache/
vb array
2 0 0 0.004 0.001 0.028 0.009 1 64 0.000
buffer/Queue/
T 35 data[0]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.002 1 64 0.000
buffer/Queue/
T 35 data[1]
2 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.002 1 64 0.000
core/csr/
reg mscratch
2 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.030 0.009 1 64 0.000
core/
mem reg wdata
1 0 0 0.080 0.001 0.917 0.028 1 64 0.000
core/div/
remainder
2 0 0 0.024 0.013 0.429 0.159 1 130 0.000
B.3 Automatic Waypoint Guide Report
Listing B.1: PicoRV32
Fl ip F lop : la tched branch
Nickname : latched branch ,
CL1 : L1281 ( la tched branch | | i r q s t a t e | | ! r e s e t n )
SL1 : L1502 ( la tched branch )
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : l a t c h e d s t o r e
Nickname : l a t c h e d s t o r e ,
CL1 :
SL1 :
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : l a t c h e d s t a l u
Nickname : l a t c h e d s t a l u ,
CL1 :
SL1 :
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SL2 :
F l ip F lop : l a t c h ed r d
Nickname : la tched rd ,
CL1 :
SL1 : L1320 ( r e s e t n&&cpureg s wr i t e&&l a t c h ed r d )
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : cpu s ta t e
Nickname : cpu state ,
CL1 : L1170 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e t r a p )
L1171 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e f e t c h )
L1172 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e l d r s 1 )
L1173 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e l d r s 2 )
L1174 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e e x e c )
L1175 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e s h i f t )
L1176 ( cpu s ta t e==cpu state stmem )
L1177 ( cpu s ta t e==cpu state ldmem )
L1295 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e f e t c h )
L2059 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e t r a p )
L2060 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e f e t c h )
L2061 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e l d r s 1 )
L2062 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e l d r s 2 )
L2063 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e e x e c )
L2064 ( cpu s ta t e==c p u s t a t e s h i f t )
L2065 ( cpu s ta t e==cpu state stmem )
L2066 ( cpu s ta t e==cpu state ldmem )
SL1 : L1468 ( cpu s ta t e )
SL2 :
Listing B.2: Rocket Core
Fl ip F lop : wb reg in s t
Nickname : wb reg ins t , wb reg in s t 0 ,
CL1 :
SL1 :
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : wb ctrl mem
Nickname : wb ctrl mem , T 1204 , T 1205 , T 1207 , T 1216
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T 1217 , T 1209 , T 1218 , T 1211 , T 1219
T 1213 , T 1220 , wb xcpt , T 1242 , T 1243
take pc wb , take pc mem wb , wb dcache miss , r e p l a y e x l o a d u s e ,
T 1184
t v a l v a l i d , unpause , i o imem req va l i d , wb ctrl mem ,
wb dcache miss 0
wb xcpt 0 , i b u f i o k i l l , c s r i o e x c e p t i o n ,
CL1 : L168124 ( take pc mem wb==1’h0 ) L168141 ( wb xcpt==1’h0 )
L168296 ( take pc wb==1’h0 ) L168396 ( take pc wb==1’h0 )
SL1 : L169118 ( unpause )
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : wb reg rep lay
Nickname : wb reg rep lay , replay wb common , replay wb , T 1242 ,
T 1243
take pc wb , take pc mem wb , T 1184 , unpause , i o i m e m r e q v a l i d
replay wb 0 , i b u f i o k i l l ,
CL1 : L168124 ( take pc mem wb==1’h0 ) L168139 ( replay wb==1’h0 )
L168296 ( take pc wb==1’h0 ) L168396 ( take pc wb==1’h0 )
SL1 : L169118 ( unpause )
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : wb reg xcpt
Nickname : wb reg xcpt , T 1216 , T 1217 , T 1218 , T 1219
T 1220 , wb xcpt , T 1242 , T 1243 , take pc wb
take pc mem wb , T 1184 , t v a l v a l i d , unpause , i o i m e m r e q v a l i d
wb xcpt 0 , i b u f i o k i l l , c s r i o e x c e p t i o n ,
CL1 : L168124 ( take pc mem wb==1’h0 ) L168141 ( wb xcpt==1’h0 )
L168296 ( take pc wb==1’h0 ) L168396 ( take pc wb==1’h0 )
SL1 : L169118 ( unpause )
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : wb reg va l id
Nickname : wb reg va l id , T 1484 , T 1486 , T 1255 , T 1257
T 1331 , T 983 , T 1010 , T 1011 , T 1204
T 1205 , T 1207 , T 1451 , p s to r e d ra in , d a t a A r b i o i n 0 v a l i d
d a t a A r b i o i n 0 b i t s w r i t e , T 985 , T 1332 , T 1333 , T 1334
rep lay wb rocc , replay wb , T 1216 , T 1217 , T 1209
T 1218 , T 1211 , T 1219 , T 1213 , T 1220
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wb xcpt , T 1242 , T 1243 , take pc wb , take pc mem wb
id wb hazard , T 1349 , id sboard hazard , wb wxd , wb val id
wb wen , rf wen , T 1184 , t v a l v a l i d , T 1350
T 1354 , unpause , T 1569 , i o imem req va l i d ,
i o i m e m s f e n c e v a l i d
i o i m e m f l u s h i c a c h e , wb xcpt 0 , replay wb 0 , wb reg va l id 0 ,
wb wen 0
i b u f i o k i l l , c s r i o e x c e p t i o n , c s r i o r e t i r e ,
CL1 : L666 ( T 1011==9’h0 ) L3763 ( i o i n d b i t s p a r a m== T 983 )
L3766 ( i o i n d b i t s s i z e== T 985 ) L6983 ( T 1486==1’h0 )
L8333 ( T 1011==9’h0 ) L11576 ( T 1011==9’h0 )
L16340 ( T 1257==1’h0 ) L33903 ( i o i n d b i t s p a r a m== T 983
) L33906 ( i o i n d b i t s s i z e== T 985 ) L38146 (
i o i n d b i t s p a r a m== T 983 ) L38149 ( i o i n d b i t s s i z e
== T 985 )
L41393 ( i o i n d b i t s p a r a m== T 983 ) L41396 (
i o i n d b i t s s i z e== T 985 ) L45356 ( i o i n d b i t s p a r a m
== T 983 ) L45359 ( i o i n d b i t s s i z e== T 985 ) L49265 (
i o i n d b i t s p a r a m== T 983 )
L49268 ( i o i n d b i t s s i z e== T 985 ) L56760 (
i o i n d b i t s p a r a m== T 983 ) L56763 ( i o i n d b i t s s i z e
== T 985 ) L123059 ( T 983== T 983 ) L123077 ( T 983 !=2 ’
h0 )
L153920 ( p s t o r e d r a i n ==1’h0 ) L153921 ( p s t o r e 2 v a l i d==
p s t o r e d r a i n ) L158044 ( T 1011==9’h0 ) L168079 ( T 1331
==1’h0 ) L168110 (wb wxd==1’h0 )
L168124 ( take pc mem wb==1’h0 ) L168139 ( replay wb==1’h0 )
L168141 ( wb xcpt==1’h0 ) L168296 ( take pc wb==1’h0 )
L168386 ( T 1350==1’h0 )
L168396 ( take pc wb==1’h0 )
SL1 : L32836 ( T 965& T 985 ) L32847 ( T 965& T 985 ) L62881 (
T 965& T 985 ) L62892 ( T 965& T 985 ) L66830 ( T 965& T 985
) L66841 ( T 965& T 985 )
L70057 ( T 965& T 985 ) L70068 ( T 965& T 985 ) L74065 (
T 965& T 985 ) L74076 ( T 965& T 985 ) L78028 ( T 965&
T 985 )
L78039 ( T 965& T 985 ) L111248 ( T 965& T 985 ) L111259 (
T 965& T 985 ) L148647 ( T 1011& T 1019 ) L148658 (
T 1011& T 1019 )
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L151388 ( T 1011& T 1019 ) L151399 ( T 1011& T 1019 )
L169118 ( unpause ) L169739 ( T 1354 )
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : wb ctr l wxd
Nickname : wb ctr l wxd , data hazard wb , wb wxd , wb wen , r f wen
T 1350 , T 1354 , T 1569 , wb ctrl wxd , wb wen 0
CL1 : L168110 (wb wxd==1’h0 ) L168386 ( T 1350==1’h0 )
SL1 : L169739 ( T 1354 )
SL2 :
F l ip F lop : w b c t r l c s r
Nickname : w b c t r l c s r , c s r io rw cmd ,
CL1 : L168150 ( w b c t r l c s r !=3 ’ h0 )
SL1 :
SL2 :
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Appendix C
Verilog source code
C.1 Synchronized FIFO
Listing C.1: Synchronized FIFO source code
module s y n c f i f o # (
parameter a b i t s = 2 , // f i f o depth
parameter db i t s = 8 // data width
) (
input c lock ,
input r e s e t ,
input wr ,
input rd ,
input [ db i t s −1:0 ] din ,
output empty ,
output f u l l ,
output [ db i t s −1:0 ] dout
) ;
wire db wr , db rd ;
reg dffw1 , dffw2 , d f f r 1 , d f f r 2 ;
reg [ db i t s −1:0 ] out ;
reg [ db i t s −1:0 ] r egar ray [2∗∗ ab i t s −1 : 0 ] ;
reg [ ab i t s −1:0 ] wr reg , wr next , wr succ ;
reg [ ab i t s −1:0 ] rd reg , rd next , rd succ ;
reg f u l l r e g , empty reg , f u l l n e x t , empty next ;
always @ (posedge c l o ck ) dffw1 <= wr ;
always @ (posedge c l o ck ) dffw2 <= dffw1 ;
assign db wr = ˜ dffw1 & dffw2 ;
assign wr en = db wr & ˜ f u l l ;
always @ (posedge c l o ck ) d f f r 1 <= rd ;
always @ (posedge c l o ck ) d f f r 2 <= d f f r 1 ;
assign db rd = ˜ d f f r 1 & d f f r 2 ;
always @ (posedge c l o ck ) begin
i f ( wr en ) regar ray [ wr reg ] <= din ;
end
always @ (posedge c l o ck ) begin
i f ( db rd ) out <= regar ray [ rd r eg ] ;
end
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always @ (posedge c l o ck or posedge r e s e t ) begin
i f ( r e s e t ) begin
wr reg <= 0 ;
rd r eg <= 0 ;
f u l l r e g <= 1 ’ b0 ;
empty reg <= 1 ’ b1 ;
end
else begin
wr reg <= wr next ;
rd r eg <= rd next ;
f u l l r e g <= f u l l n e x t ;
empty reg <= empty next ;
end
end
always @(∗ ) begin
wr succ = wr reg + 1 ;
rd succ = rd r eg + 1 ;
wr next = wr reg ;
rd next = rd r eg ;
f u l l n e x t = f u l l r e g ;
empty next = empty reg ;
case ({db wr , db rd })
2 ’ b01 : // read
begin
i f (˜ empty ) begin
rd next = rd succ ;
f u l l n e x t = 1 ’ b0 ;
i f ( rd succ == wr reg ) empty next = 1 ’ b1 ;
end
end
2 ’ b10 : // wr i t e
begin
i f (˜ f u l l ) begin
wr next = wr succ ;
empty next = 1 ’ b0 ;
i f ( wr succ == rd r eg ) f u l l n e x t = 1 ’ b1 ;
end
end
2 ’ b11 :
begin
wr next = wr succ ;
rd next = rd succ ;
end
default :
endcase
end
assign f u l l = f u l l r e g ;
assign empty = empty reg ;
assign dout = out ;
endmodule
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